


# Towards A Global Resilience Agenda

## Action on Climate Fragility Risks

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adelphi



Clingendael

Netherlands Institute of International Relations



Planetary Security  
INITIATIVE

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Cover photo: Platoon commanders and non-commissioned officers of the Somali National Army (SNA) sit during a graduation ceremony at the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Jazira training facility in the Somali capital Mogadishu. © alamy.com

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# Executive Summary

This report takes stock of key developments since the publishing of the independent report *A New Climate for Peace* commissioned by G7 members. It provides a concise risk horizon scan for 2015 and 2016, and an overview and assessment of key policy developments in 2015 and 2016 that are of relevance for addressing climate-fragility risks.

In 2015 *A New Climate for Peace* compiled the evidence that was available about how climate change was interacting with other features of the social, economic and political landscape to contribute, in some places and some cases, to instability, insecurity, low level conflicts and worse. Developments in 2015 and 2016 confirm that assessment.

In regards to climate change, a series of temperature records and the growing number and severity of extreme weather events in 2015 and 2016 illustrate what it might mean to leave the planet's safe operating space. In parallel we have witnessed an unstable international political context. The Middle East remains in turmoil and neither regional nor global efforts to mitigate the violent conflicts seem to have much effect. The number of armed conflicts has risen back to the level that it was in the early 1990s, blowing away the gains of two decades of peacebuilding efforts. There is a historically high level of refugees and internally displaced people. Relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated and remain fraught because of Crimea, Ukraine and Syria. These geopolitical rivalries have intensified in the past five years and became particularly sharp in the last two. Overall, the intersection of accelerating impacts of climate change, the continuing increase in numbers of armed conflicts and deepening geopolitical rivalries create a deeply unsettling new normal.

At the same time, and much more positively, the international community has shown that it can act together to address global problems. The Agenda 2030, the Paris Agreement, the World Humanitarian Summit, and Habitat III and its New Urban Agenda all show that there are efforts to find a viable change strategy. This is mirrored by activities of the G7, within the UN Security Council and its wider peacebuilding architecture, the African Union, and the European Union that acknowledge and try to specifically address climate-fragility risks.

As always, the devil is in the details – specifically, the details of implementation. Deficiencies in terms of ambition aside, there are two global agreements in 2015 that set the framework for immediate work on global resilience – the Paris Agreement on climate change and the adoption of Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals. There are three key challenges to that framework and its practical implementation.

The first is the importance of integration. The point of integration is that, while parallel actions by different agencies (and different departments within them) may be directed at the right goals, opportunities for synergy will be lost, the probability of duplicating effort is quite high, and the risks in terms of unintended negative effects increase. Integration, in short, is an efficiency measure.

The second challenge for the global resilience agenda lies in the realm of geopolitics. It would not be a viable political agenda to insist on geopolitical rivalries taking second place to the requirements of planetary security. What is reasonable is to argue that environmental sustainability is now a geopolitical interest. For the good of the environment, as part of planetary security, effort is needed on all sides to handle current geopolitical rivalries as peacefully, constructively and cooperatively as possible.

The third challenge lies at national level. If there is a roll back in key countries such as the US of the tenuous near-consensus on climate change that made the Paris Agreement possible, that will inevitably have a direct effect on the potential for implementing a global resilience agenda.

On the basis of this survey and discussion of recent developments in climate-fragility risk and response, we offer the following three recommendations and priorities for the next 12 months to governments and other actors who recognise the risks of climate-fragility:

1. Put increased effort into climate diplomacy. This community has to prepare to win the arguments again and again. In the face of recent developments, foreign policy makers will have to continue and further increase their climate diplomacy efforts in order to maintain the momentum established by the Paris Agreement.
2. Protect the gains that have been registered so far. We need to find ways to lock achievements in so as to maintain momentum. A challenge in this regard is the lack of institutionalisation when it comes to building resilience against climate-fragility risks. A starting point could be to create an international hub that can provide analysis and advice on climate-fragility risks.
3. Continue to focus on integration and enabling strategies for institutional change management. To fulfil the framework established by the Paris Agreement and Agenda 2030, there is no way around integration. How to foster the global resilience agenda and achieve integration was spelled out in detail in *A New Climate for Peace*. The recommendations given then are still valid and can serve as entry points for action.

It is a truism to state that a set of recommendations like these – a task like the one that faces us to address climate-fragility risks – requires leadership. In times when there is a real risk of roll back and losing what has been achieved, leadership will have to be provided by all committed actors. It is the collective responsibility of governments, inter-governmental organisations, NGOs, research centres and individuals who have signed up to take these ideas forward.

# 1 Introduction and Background

In 2015, the annual G7 meeting of foreign ministers received and endorsed an independent report, *A New Climate for Peace*.<sup>1</sup> The report has been widely discussed. It examines compound risks for security and stability associated with climate change – expressed as climate-fragility risks – and the policy agenda for responding to those risks. It offers recommendations for assessing, managing and reducing the risks. This background paper for the 2016 Planetary Security Initiative conference in The Hague looks at developments both in the risks faced and the actions taken since the report for the G7 was finalised in Spring 2015.

Global environmental change is proceeding at an intense rate and with growing effects. The issue is not only climate change, with the last two years seeing the density of carbon emitted into atmosphere hitting a new peak and with global temperature records broken every month. The issue is also loss of biodiversity, ocean acidification, shortage of fresh water with land degradation, heat waves and droughts, and more.<sup>2</sup> The combination of these changes lies behind the assertion, broadly accepted at the International Geological Congress in Cape Town in August 2016, that we have entered a new era – the Anthropocene.<sup>3</sup> This concept denotes the immense implications human activities have for the world's ecological systems, including climates. Some environmental scientists are now expressing concern that human activity has been and remains on such a scale and with such far-reaching impacts that the human habitability of the planet is at risk:

The numbers are overwhelming. The planet's under unprecedented pressure. Too many forests cut down. Too many fish pulled from the sea. Too many species gone extinct. Earth's being battered by humanity – and it's coming from every direction. Greenhouse gases. Ocean acidification. Chemical pollution. It has all reached a point where our future is at risk. For the first time in human history, we may have pushed the planet too far.<sup>4</sup>

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- 1 Rüttinger, L., et al. 2015. *A New Climate for Peace: Taking Action on Climate and Fragility Risks*, Berlin, adelphi, <https://www.newclimateforpeace.org/> (accessed November 2016).
  - 2 IPCC 2014. *Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
  - 3 Carrington, D. 2016. 'The Anthropocene epoch: scientists declare dawn of human-influenced age', *The Guardian*, 29 August, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/aug/29/declare-anthropocene-epoch-experts-urge-geological-congress-human-impact-earth> (accessed November 2016).
  - 4 Rockström, J. and Klum, M. 2015. *Big World Small Planet*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 15.

The driving concept behind this warning is 'planetary boundaries', which was established in 2009 by a group of scientists convened by the Stockholm Resilience Centre.<sup>5</sup> To this way of thinking, nine ecological systems make up the overall boundary of sustainability for life on our planet. As the individual boundaries are breached, we begin to move outside what we know to be a safe operating space for humanity. What lies on the other side of the boundaries, and how different breaches will interact with each other, is as yet unknown. Four planetary boundaries have already been breached as a result of human activity – climate change, biodiversity, land-system change, and biogeochemical cycles (phosphorus and nitrogen). Two of these – climate change and biodiversity – are regarded as core boundaries, meaning that if they are significantly breached the Earth System will be brought into a new state.<sup>6</sup>

These pressures on the natural system are increasingly affecting states and societies. The report *A New Climate for Peace* identified seven compound climate-fragility risks that threaten stability. When and where climate change converges with other economic, social, political and environmental pressures, it can overburden states and societies. It can spur social upheaval and increase the risk of violent conflict. Even seemingly stable states can be pushed towards instability if the pressure is heavy enough or the shock is too great. The argument of *A New Climate for Peace* is that climate change has become important in the combinations of pressures that push countries into instability, fragility and conflict. It multiplies the effect of other pressures and risks such as poor governance, social inequalities and a record of recent violent conflict to undermine human security.

2015 and 2016 have underlined the urgency of these challenges. The increasing pressure of climate change has developed in parallel with the deteriorating geopolitical setting. A series of temperature records<sup>7</sup> and the growing number and severity of extreme weather events illustrate what it might mean to leave the planet's safe operating space. At the same time we have witnessed an unstable international political context. The Middle East remains in turmoil and neither regional nor global efforts to mitigate the violent conflicts seem to have much effect. The number of armed conflicts has risen back to the level that it was in the early 1990s, blowing away the gains of two decades of peacebuilding efforts.<sup>8</sup> There is a historically high level of refugees and internally displaced people. Relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated and remain

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5 Rockström, J., et al. 2009. 'A safe operating space for humanity', *Nature*, 461, 472-475.

6 Steffen, W. et al. 2015. Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet, *Science*, 13 February, 347(6223). 1286-1287.

7 Thompson, A. 2016. '99 Percent Chance' 2016 Will Be Hottest Year', *Climate Central*, 18 May, <http://www.climatecentral.org/news/99-percent-chance-2016-hottest-year-20359> (accessed November 2016).

8 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University: [www.ucdp.uu.se](http://www.ucdp.uu.se)

fraught because of Crimea, Ukraine and Syria. These developments make international cooperation more difficult at a time when it is more needed than ever.

So far, it has not proven easy to absorb the relationship between climate change and fragility into the framework of policy-making.<sup>9</sup> It is mentioned in communiqués and policy statements but there is limited feed-through from recognition to practice. It has been generally concluded that the complex, intersecting and multi-sectoral nature of the challenges posed by the climate-security linkage makes policy responses unusually complex and difficult. For many political leaders and officials alike, this is a new field and it is hard to get beyond responses that essentially consist of modest modifications to business as usual. Nevertheless, the policy agenda is not static. There are efforts to find a viable change strategy. Most notably, the achievement of the Paris Agreement in 2015 marked a moment of consensus about the importance of combatting climate change both through mitigation and adaptation efforts. The past two years have also seen a global consensus on the future of development in the form of the new Sustainable Development Goals, international efforts to address the humanitarian and refugee crisis, and reconsideration of the UN peacebuilding architecture.

This report takes stock of these developments. It does not explore one major risk that has emerged, which must be acknowledged: the election of Donald Trump as US President and the anticipation that a root and branch change in US environmental policy will ensue. What the Trump administration will do is not yet clear though the shape of his transition team<sup>10</sup> and early reports of options under review<sup>11</sup> reflect his stated climate scepticism. Warnings are starting to reverberate from climate scientists and environmentalists.<sup>12</sup> How other countries will react is a further unknown. Some may be encouraged to depart from the growing consensus of recent years on the reality of climate change and the urgency of mitigation and adaptation.<sup>13</sup> Other countries by

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9 Mobjörk, M., et al. 2016. *Climate-Related Security Risks: Towards an Integrated Approach*, Stockholm, SIPRI and SU.

10 Bravender, R. 2016. 'Trump Picks Top Climate Skeptic to Head EPA Transition', *Scientific American*, 26 September, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-picks-top-climate-skeptic-to-lead-epa-transition/> (accessed November 2016).

11 The Guardian 2016. *Trump seeking quickest way to quit Paris climate agreement, says report*, 13 November, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/13/trump-looking-at-quickest-way-to-quit-paris-climate-agreement-says-report> (accessed November 2016).

12 Milman, O. 2016. 'Donald Trump presidency "a disaster for the planet", warn climate scientists', *The Guardian*, 11 November, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/nov/11/trump-presidency-a-disaster-for-the-planet-climate-change> (accessed November 2016).

13 Neslen, A. and Vaughan, A. 2016. 'Trump victory may embolden other nations to obstruct Paris climate deal', *The Guardian*, 11 November, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/nov/11/trump-victory-may-embolden-other-nations-to-obstruct-paris-climate-deal> (accessed November 2016).

contrast may be encouraged towards adopting new policy instruments and developing new inter-governmental coalitions for effective action, even in line with the global resilience agenda.

The report is structured in three parts. The first chapter provides a concise risk horizon scan for 2015 and 2016 covering climate change impacts, the rise in conflicts, the migrant and refugee crisis, and the return of geopolitical rivalry. Chapter 2 gives an overview and assessment of key policy developments in 2015 and 2016 that are of relevance for addressing climate-fragility risks. The third chapter draws summary conclusions and provides three recommendations and priorities for the next 12 months to governments and other actors who recognise the risks of climate-fragility.

## 2 Climate-fragility Risks

The G7 report “A New Climate for Peace” emphasised that climate-fragility risks are already playing out today and concluded that these risks are likely to worsen in the decades to come. This assessment is borne out by developments since the publication. Both in terms of climate and conflict, 2015 and 2016 broke new records. This chapter examines these developments and provides a concise risk horizon scan for 2015 and 2016. It focuses in particular on climate change impacts, the increasing number of conflicts and of refugees, and renewed geopolitical rivalries. It is not a comprehensive assessment, but focuses on major trends and events that affect climate-fragility risks and will most likely continue to shape these risks in the years to come.

### This is what climate change looks like

2015 was the warmest year on record with temperatures about 1°C above pre-industrial levels.<sup>14</sup> Each month of the first half of 2016 broke further records: the average temperature for the full six month period was 1.3°C higher than the average in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>15</sup> This was partly due to the extremely strong El Niño event<sup>16</sup> in 2015-2016 which was among the strongest El Niños on records.<sup>17</sup>

The increasing temperatures put marine ecosystems under further stress, with coral reefs bleaching at record rates and eventually dying. Since 2014 the world has been experiencing one of its longest coral bleaching events. Scientists estimate that

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14 World Meteorological Organization 2016. *WMO Statement of the Status of the Global Climate in 2015*, [http://library.wmo.int/pmb\\_ged/wmo\\_1167\\_en.pdf](http://library.wmo.int/pmb_ged/wmo_1167_en.pdf) (accessed November 2016).

15 Lynch, P. 2016. 'Climate Trends Continue to Break Records', *NASA Goddard Space Flight Center*, 19 July, <https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2016/climate-trends-continue-to-break-records> (accessed November 2016).

16 Ramsayer, K. 2016. 'After Strong El Niño Winter, NASA Model Sees Return to Normal', *NASA Goddard Space Flight Center*, 13 September, <https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2016/after-strong-el-nino-nasa-sees-return-to-normal> (accessed November 2016).

17 NOAA Earth System Research Laboratory 2016. *Unprecedented effort launched to discover how El Niño affects weather*, 5 February, <http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/psd/news/2016/020516.html> (accessed November 2016).

35 per cent of corals on the northern and central Great Barrier Reef are dying or are already dead and 80 per cent of corals in Kiribati have died due to mass bleaching.<sup>18</sup>

At the same time, the sea ice cap of the Arctic reached the smallest annual maximum extent in 2015 and hit a new record low in the first half of 2016.<sup>19</sup> The melting of the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets contribute to rising sea levels.<sup>20</sup> The global average sea level from January to November 2015 was the highest ever recorded by satellites.<sup>21</sup>

Extreme weather events continued to increase in severity and number.<sup>22</sup> In 2015, major heatwaves struck India and Pakistan, where temperatures reached up to 47°C for several days and claimed the lives of about 4,000 people.<sup>23</sup> Various countries are coping with droughts, with Ethiopia facing the second year of its worst drought in decades, and California entering its sixth year.<sup>24</sup> Extreme rainfall and flooding in Paraguay, northern Argentina and southern Brazil affected about 180,000 people and displaced about 80,000 in 2015. Further, 91 tropical storms were recorded in 2015, which is six more than the annual average of 1981-2010.<sup>25</sup>

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- 18 Eatkin, C.M. et al. 2016. 'Global Coral Bleaching 2014-2017. Status and an Appeal for Observations', *Reef Encounter, The News Journal of the International Society for Reef Studies*, April, 31(1), [http://coralreefwatch.noaa.gov/satellite/publications/reef-encounter\\_042016\\_crw-2014-17\\_global\\_bleaching\\_final.pdf](http://coralreefwatch.noaa.gov/satellite/publications/reef-encounter_042016_crw-2014-17_global_bleaching_final.pdf) (accessed November 2016); ARC Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies 2016. *Coral death toll climbs on Great Barrier Reef*, 30 May, <https://www.coralcoe.org.au/media-releases/coral-death-toll-climbs-on-great-barrier-reef> (accessed November 2016).
- 19 Viñas, M.-J. 2015. '2015 Arctic Sea Ice Maximum Annual Extent Is Lowest On Record', *NASA Goddard Space Flight Center*, 31 July, <http://www.nasa.gov/content/goddard/2015-arctic-sea-ice-maximum-annual-extent-is-lowest-on-record> (accessed November 2016); Viñas, M.-J. 2016. '2016 Arctic Sea Ice Wintertime Extent Hits Another Record Low', *NASA Goddard Space Flight Center*, 28 March, <http://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2016/2016-arctic-sea-ice-wintertime-extent-hits-another-record-low> (accessed November 2016).
- 20 Briggs, K. H., et al. 2016. 'Charting Ice Sheet Contributions to Global Sea Level Rise', *EOS Earth & Space Sciences News*, 18 July, <https://eos.org/project-updates/charting-ice-sheet-contributions-to-global-sea-level-rise> (accessed November 2016).
- 21 World Meteorological Organization, *op. cit.*
- 22 Brown, P. 2016. 'Europe must prepare for extreme weather', *climate news network*, 7 October, <http://climatenewsnetwork.net/europe-prepare-extreme-weather/> (accessed November 2016); Fischer, E. M. and Knutti, R. 2015. 'Anthropogenic contribution to global occurrence of heavy-precipitation and high-temperature extremes', *Nature Climate Change*, 5, 560-564.
- 23 World Meteorological Organization, *op. cit.*
- 24 ReliefWeb 2016. *Ethiopia: Drought - 2015-2016*, <http://reliefweb.int/disaster/dr-2015-000109-eth> (accessed November 2016); U.S. Geological Survey 2016. *California Drought*, <http://ca.water.usgs.gov/data/drought/index.html> (accessed November 2016).
- 25 World Meteorological Organization, *op. cit.*

Although many records were broken, this was not a surprising development. Leading climate scientists concluded that “[g]lobal warming is proceeding pretty much exactly as predicted”.<sup>26</sup> It was “confirm[ed] once again [...] how unusual the age of modern global warming due to our greenhouse gas emissions is”.<sup>27</sup> In short, breaking records for temperature and extreme weather has become the new normal.

Some previous estimates seem to have been too conservative. For example, the melting of Greenland’s ice was underestimated. With the help of new GPS technologies, a study found that the ice loss is about 7.6 per cent higher than previously estimated.<sup>28</sup> Some scientists concluded that the tipping point for the parts of the West Antarctic might already have been reached, in which case the melting of ice might be unstoppable.<sup>29</sup>

Looking into the future, several new assessments underline the severity of increasing impacts of climate change and outline gloomy scenarios. The World Bank stated in a 2016 report that, unless action is taken soon, water security will be at risk in most parts of Africa and Asia by 2050 – even in regions where water is currently available in abundance – with severe impacts on economies, health and incomes and increasing the risk of conflict and violence.<sup>30</sup> Researchers at the Max Planck Institute for Chemistry and the Cyprus Institute in Nicosia have warned that, even if global warming is limited to an average of 2°C, large parts of the Middle East and North Africa will become too hot for human habitation. They project that by the mid-century, in the warm period of the year, temperatures will oscillate between 30°C at night and 46°C during the day. Combined with air pollution caused by desert storms, these conditions may become unbearable and force large numbers of people to move.<sup>31</sup>

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26 Readfearn, G. 2016. ‘Welcome to the climate emergency: you’re about 20 years late’, *The Guardian*, 17 March, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/planet-oz/2016/mar/18/welcome-to-the-climate-emergency-youre-about-20-years-late> (accessed November 2016).

27 Potsdam Institute For Climate Impact Research, 2016. *Sea-level rise past and future: robust estimates for coastal planners*, 23 February, <https://www.pik-potsdam.de/news/press-releases/sea-level-rise-past-and-future-robust-estimates-for-coastal-planners> (accessed November 2016).

28 Frost Gorder, P. 2016. ‘Greenland ice is melting 7 percent faster than previously thought’, *The Ohio State University News Room*, 21 September, <https://news.osu.edu/news/2016/09/21/magmaice/> (accessed November 2016).

29 Witze, A. 2014. ‘Crucial West Antarctic glaciers are retreating unstoppably’, *Nature News*, 12 May, <http://www.nature.com/news/crucial-west-antarctic-glaciers-are-retreating-unstoppably-1.15202> (accessed November 2016).

30 The World Bank 2016. *High and Dry. Climate Change, Water, and the Economy*, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/23665/K8517.pdf> (accessed November 2016).

31 Max Planck Gesellschaft 2016. *Climate-exodus expected in the Middle East and North Africa*, 2 May, <https://www.mpg.de/10481936/climate-change-middle-east-north-africa> (accessed November 2016).

## Conflicts on the rise

2015 was “one of the darkest years for international stability and human security since the end of the cold war in 1991”.<sup>32</sup> The total number of state-based armed conflicts rose from 41 in 2014 to 50 in 2015 and non-state conflicts from 61 in 2014 to 70 in 2015. Although the upward trend since 2012 in fatalities did not continue in 2015, in terms of conflict-caused fatalities, it was the third-worst year<sup>33</sup> since the end of the Cold War.<sup>34</sup>

Warfare in Syria accounted for most of the fatalities. The country is going through a complex conflict involving insurgents, the government, outside powers and international *jihadi* fighters.<sup>35</sup> Although there is no certainty about numbers of victims, and estimates vary greatly<sup>36</sup>, it is evident that several hundreds of thousands of Syrians have lost their lives and millions have been forced to leave their homes since war began in 2011.<sup>37</sup> Other parts of the Middle East remain in turmoil and neither regional nor global efforts to mitigate the violent conflicts seem to have had much effect. Armed conflict involving local and international actors escalated in Yemen in 2015. In Iraq, Libya and Egypt, ISIS was gaining ground for most of 2015 and part of 2016; major offensives against it in northern Syria and in Mosul, Iraq, appeared by late 2016 to be inflicting reverses on ISIS but longer term outcomes remain uncertain. Meanwhile, the relationship between Israel and Palestine remains tense and violence erupts repeatedly.<sup>38</sup>

Another major trouble spot is Ukraine where there is prolonged crisis. Armed conflict between Russian-backed separatist groups in the eastern Donbass region and the

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32 SIPRI 2016. SIPRI Yearbook 2016. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1.

33 The worst year after the Cold War was 1994 with approximately 500,000 to 800,000 fatalities (mostly caused by the Rwandan genocide) and 2014 with 130,000 fatalities.

34 Melander, E., et al. 2016. 'Organized Violence, 1989-2015', *Journal of Peace Research*, 53 (5), 727-742.

35 SIPRI 2016. SIPRI Yearbook 2016. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

36 Taylor, A. 2016. 'The Syrian war's death toll is absolutely staggering. But no one can agree on the number', *The Washington Post*, 15 March, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/03/15/the-syrian-wars-death-toll-is-absolutely-staggering-but-no-one-can-agree-on-the-number/> (accessed November 2016).

37 The death toll estimations from the beginning of the conflict up to December 2015 vary between 188,000 (Melander et al., *op. cit.*) and 470,000 deaths (Syrian Centre for Policy Research 2016. *Syria. Confronting Fragmentation! Impact of Syrian Crisis report*, <http://scpr-syria.org/publications/confronting-fragmentation/> (accessed November 2016)). As of September 2016, 6.1 million people were displaced within Syria and about 4.8 million people forced to flee to other countries (UN OCHA 2016. *Syria Crisis: About the crisis*, <http://www.unocha.org/syrian-arab-republic/syria-country-profile/about-crisis> (accessed November 2016)).

38 SIPRI, *op. cit.*

Ukrainian Government has claimed about 10,000 lives and displaced about 1.7 million persons.<sup>39</sup> The mostly unimplemented 2015 Minsk peace agreement could reduce the fatality rate, yet the ceasefire “is being violated daily and heavily” with no end in sight.<sup>40</sup>

There have been, nonetheless, some positive developments in 2015 and 2016. Among them was the agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of action for the regulation of Iran’s nuclear program between Iran, the United States, the European Union and five other states.<sup>41</sup> In September 2016, the Colombian Government and the guerrilla group FARC signed a peace agreement, sparking hope to overcome 52 years of civil war. Although it was rejected in a public referendum, the Government and FARC leaders are working to save the peace deal. In October, both parties resumed talks to renegotiate the agreement and the bilateral ceasefire was extended at least until the end of the year.<sup>42</sup>

In the 1990s and the first decade of this century, Sub-Saharan Africa was a zone of widespread, chronic, and violent conflict. Across large parts of the continent, the picture in 2015 and 2016 was not so grim though conflict remains high in Nigeria and South Sudan and showed signs of escalating in Burundi, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo as 2016 wore on.<sup>43</sup>

Overall, 2015 and 2016 are a continuation of a longer trend. After the end of the Cold War, the world’s “zone of peace”<sup>44</sup> expanded, with fewer and on average shorter armed conflicts, largely driven by an increase in international activism in peace mediation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.<sup>45</sup> Yet, from 2010 on, the “zone of peace” started

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- 39 Quinn-Judge, P. 2016. 'Ukraine's Meat Grinder Is Back in Business', *Foreign Policy*, 12 April, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/12/ukraines-meat-grinder-is-back-in-business/>; IDMC 2016. *Internal Displacement Update*, 1, January – August 2016, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2016/201609-internal-displacement-update.pdf> (accessed November 2016).
- 40 International Crisis Group 2016. 'Ukraine: The Line', *Crisis Group Europe Briefing No 81*, 18 July, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/ukraine-the-line.pdf> (accessed November 2016).
- 41 SIPRI, op. cit.
- 42 Deutsche Welle 2016. *Colombia, FARC resume peace talks*, 23 October, <http://www.dw.com/en/colombia-farc-resume-peace-talks/a-36124469> (accessed November 2016).
- 43 See the CrisisWatch Database by the International Crisis Group for the respective countries for 2015 and 2016, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/database> (accessed November 2016).
- 44 Smith, D. 2016. 'Whither Peace?', *Dan Smith's Blog*, 21 September, <https://dansmithsblog.com/2016/09/21/whither-peace/#more-3178> (accessed November 2016).
- 45 Human Security Centre 2005. *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, <http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2005/text.aspx> (accessed November 2016).

to contract as the number of conflicts rose and are today back at a level the global community has not seen for two decades.<sup>46</sup>

## Refugees and migration: short and long-term consequences

Mainly driven by conflicts, the number of forcibly displaced people and refugees has been rising in recent years. 2015 was no exception: worldwide displacement numbers were the highest since World War II. Forced displacement as a result of persecution, conflict, violence and human rights violations increased to a total of 65.3 million people in 2015 with 12.4 million newly displaced. The Middle East and East Africa are especially affected with Syria (4.9 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), Somalia (1.12 million) and South Sudan (778,700) leading the list.<sup>47</sup>

Most people who were displaced remain within their countries. In 2015 there were 40.8 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs) due to violence and conflict, twice as many as the number of refugees who crossed national borders. The total included 8.6 million newly displaced, topping international refugees from violent conflict by about 2:1. Further, it bears emphasising, that most international refugees only move to neighbouring countries. The six top receiving countries worldwide are all neighbours to a conflict-affected country: Turkey (2.5 million), Lebanon (1.1 million) and Jordan (664,100) have borders with Syria; Pakistan (1.6 million) and Iran (979,400) are neighbours with Afghanistan; and Ethiopia (736,100) borders Somalia and South Sudan. Only a relatively small percentage of people who flee their homes have the will, ability and means to undertake long journeys through multiple countries. Worldwide, 86 per cent of displaced people are in the developing world.<sup>48</sup>

In short, the refugee crisis that had an impact on European politics in 2015 is not primarily a European crisis. In the European Union, over 1.2 million first-time asylum applications<sup>49</sup> created tasks that rich countries should be able to handle, though there was a heavy administrative burden and significant human, physical and financial

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46 See the Uppsala Conflict data Program's figures at [www.ucdp.uu.se](http://www.ucdp.uu.se).

47 UNHCR 2016. *Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2015*, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html> (accessed November 2016).

48 IDMC 2016. *Global Report on Internal Displacement*, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2016/2016-global-report-internal-displacement-IDMC.pdf> (accessed November 2016); UNHCR, *op. cit.*

49 Eurostat 2016. *Asylum in the EU Member States. Record number of over 1.2 million first time asylum seekers registered in 2015*, 4 March, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf> (accessed November 2016).

resources are needed to fulfil the international duty of care. The refugee crisis is primarily a crisis for refugees themselves.

Rapid-onset disasters resulting from natural events such as extreme weather or earthquake were responsible for more displacements than conflict and violence in 2015. That year, around 19 million people were newly displaced by disasters, all staying in their own countries. This is twice as many new IDPs as from conflict. As in recent years, Asia and the Pacific were especially affected. India (3.7 million), China (3.6 million), Nepal (2.6 million), the Philippines (2.2 million) and Myanmar (1.6 million) had the highest number of persons displaced by disasters.<sup>50</sup>

Looking to the future, the impact of climate change is likely to increase these trends. It will make extreme weather events both more frequent and severe and it will exacerbate environmental degradation that can threaten the livelihoods of millions of people. Most of those affected will be in Asia and Africa. Forecasts of the number of people who will move for climate or environmental reasons are hard to provide; it is extremely difficult to disaggregate the environmental component from other factors that lead to a decision to migrate.<sup>51</sup> There is clear evidence, nonetheless, that climate change will continue to shape migration patterns and will increase the number of migrants in the future.<sup>52</sup> How large these changes are will depend on the efforts to mitigate climate change and the efforts to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen resilience.

## Geopolitics

During the last two years, geopolitical rivalries have increased in severity. Already in 2014 Walter Russel Mead concluded that geopolitics have returned to the world stage.<sup>53</sup> Though the trend was established by the time that Russian forces moved into and occupied Crimea in 2014, that action was a turning point. Not only did it foreshadow

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50 IDMC, op. cit.

51 Brown, O. 2008. 'The numbers game', *Forced Migration Review*, 31, 8-9.

52 IPCC 2014. Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part A: global and sectoral aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press; The Nansen Initiative 2015, *Global Consultation, Conference Report*, 12-13 October, <https://www.nanseninitiative.org/global-consultations/> (accessed November 2016); McLeman et al. 2016. 'Environmental migration and displacement. What we know and what we don't know', Wilfrid Laurier University, 30 January, <http://www.laurierenvironmentalmigration.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/WLU-Environmental-Migration-Background-Report.pdf> (accessed November 2016).

53 Mead, W. R. 2014. 'The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers', *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-04-17/return-geopolitics> (accessed November 2016).

Russian military action in the Donbass region of Ukraine – covert and denied at first but increasingly obvious as time went on – it was also a forerunner to Russia's intervention in the war on Syria on the side of the Assad government. Regional powers in the Middle East like Iran and Saudi Arabia have also been using force, both through proxies and directly. Likewise, China has shown increased willingness to use shows of force in pressing its sovereignty claim in the South China Sea. Leaving to one side any judgements about the rights and wrongs of any or all of these actions, one conclusion to draw from this is that the US and its allies have ceased to be the only powers to wield the military instrument in support of policy goals. What has happened in the past half-decade is not that the use of force by global and regional great powers has reached new levels but, rather, that a monopoly on using force internationally has been broken.

On each occasion when force is used, the motive for doing so, while often complex and multifaceted, has been related to the object of intervention but the effect reaches wider. In the case of Ukraine, Russia was probably less concerned about the situation of Russians in Ukraine than about the possibility of Ukraine getting closer to the EU<sup>54</sup>; this would bring the West's perceived encroachment in eastern Europe to another of Russia's borders. In the case of Syria, it is the country's strategic location that makes it of such great interest and priority for Russia, Iran and, against them, Saudi Arabia. In the South China Sea, China is pursuing long held national objectives by pressing its sovereignty claims. But while the motivation is localised, the effect is globalised, by chipping away at the willingness to cooperate with each other on other issues, and undermining the mutual belief that good faith cooperation is both possible and effective.

Britain's impending withdrawal from the EU may also reduce the stock of cooperation as a means of approaching world problems. This is more likely if the eventual Brexit in 2019 is preceded by particularly tough negotiations. Some analysts go so far as to warn that Brexit "might trigger a chain reaction that could turn it into a full-blown catastrophe".<sup>55</sup> Awareness of this risk is likely to ameliorate negotiating behaviour on all sides but, overall, Brexit is a setback for European solidarity, for the political culture of multilateralism and for peaceful international cooperation.<sup>56</sup> The ramifications of withdrawal are far-reaching for both the EU and the UK and may hamper the ability of both to engage internationally on some key issues to the depth and with the proficiency of which they have generally been capable.

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54 SIPRI, *op. cit.*

55 Alcaro, R. 2016. 'Brexit ushers in a sea of troubles', *Brookings*, 28 June, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/06/28/brexit-ushers-in-a-sea-of-troubles/> (accessed November 2016).

56 De Waal, A. 2016. 'Brexit Is Bad News for Africa. Period', *Foreign Policy*, 27 June, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/27/brexit-is-bad-news-for-africa-period/> (accessed November 2016).

On top of this has come the US presidential election in November 2016 Donald Trump has made a range of statements on environmental policy (including climate change) and on foreign policy, that fall outside previously established mainstream and consensus opinions. As events unfold in 2017 and beyond, it will start to become clear which of those statements are guides to forthcoming developments in US policy. Reasons for concern were enunciated in a public letter signed by 50 senior former officials of Republican administrations. A key part of their criticisms of candidate Trump focused on his attitudes about cooperation with long-standing allies:

“Mr. Trump has demonstrated repeatedly that he has little understanding of America’s vital national interests, its complex diplomatic challenges, its indispensable alliances, and the democratic values on which U.S. foreign policy must be based. At the same time, he persistently compliments our adversaries and threatens our allies and friends.”<sup>57</sup>

One of many of today’s unknowns is whether the seeming distaste for some current allies will translate into a rejection of cooperation as such – as the NATO Secretary-General evidently fears<sup>58</sup> – or rather into a search for new cooperation partners.

To the extent that these developments diminish the will and capacity for cooperative solutions to international problems, since they will have an impact on *inter alia* climate change policies, they will have a magnified effect on security. Climate change is often referred to as a threat multiplier for security. In the same way, geopolitics may be a problem multiplier for climate change policies. Decreasing geopolitical rivalry after the end of the cold war provided an enlarged space for mediation efforts for the international community and the expansion of the zone of peace. Renewed geopolitical rivalries seem likely to have the reverse and negative effect. They increase the complexity of conflicts and hinder efforts to resolve them peacefully. As the example of Colombia shows – and it is not the only positive development in 2015 and 2016 (see below) – we have not yet arrived at a point of zero possibility for consolidating peace but the challenges of today are indeed unusually sharp.

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57 New York Times 2016. *A Letter From G.O.P. National Security Officials Opposing Donald Trump*, 8 August, [http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/08/us/politics/national-security-letter-trump.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/08/us/politics/national-security-letter-trump.html?_r=0) (accessed November 2016).

58 Stoltenberg, J. 2016. 'Now is not the time for the US to abandon Nato – nor should its European allies go it alone', *The Observer/Guardian*, 13 November, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/12/us-must-not-abandon-nato-europe-go-alone-jens-stoltenberg> (accessed November 2016).

## Conclusion: the new normal

The events and crises of 2015 and 2016 are the result of a number of larger trends playing out over contrasting chronologies. Climate change is a challenge that has been building for decades. There is considerable scientific consensus and confidence about where it is headed in global terms and improved knowledge to help understand and forecast the detailed effects and local impacts.

In 2015 *A New Climate for Peace* compiled the evidence that was available about how climate change was interacting with other features of the social, economic and political landscape to contribute, in some places and some cases, to instability, insecurity, low level conflicts and worse. Developments in 2015 and 2016 confirm that assessment and the trend of an increasing number of armed conflicts has continued. The pressure that this generated produced a record number of refugees. It is possible that conflict developments in the coming two or three years may produce comparable pressures with comparable results.

The complex task of addressing, managing and resolving armed conflicts has been yet more daunting as a result of the deterioration in relationships between the global great powers, each with local allies who are regional powers in different theatres of politics and conflict. These geopolitical rivalries have intensified in the past five years and became particularly sharp in the last two.

The intersection of accelerating impacts of climate change, the continuing increase in numbers of armed conflicts and deepening geopolitical rivalries create a deeply unsettling new normal.

# 3 Policy processes and developments

As well as the risk landscape changing since the publication of *A New Climate for Peace*, governments have continued to address climate-fragility risks. This chapter provides an overview of policy developments in 2015 and 2016 that are of relevance for addressing the risks surveyed above. It is not a comprehensive assessment, concentrating instead on sketching key policies and developments, and discussing what they mean in terms of the global resilience agenda.

The report *A New Climate For Peace* proposed a global resilience agenda to the G7 governments. It outlined how governments and in particular foreign policy makers can improve international institutions and mechanisms to lead, coordinate or foster joint action on compound climate-fragility risks. Instead of trying to address the increasing number of crisis and conflicts by piecemeal reactions to each crisis as it surfaces or developing responses that are aimed at specific threats and sectors, the global resilience agenda is cross-sectoral and integrated in nature.

The idea of strengthening the resilience of states and societies against climate-fragility risks is at the heart of this agenda. This includes resilience against a whole range of environmental, social, economic, and political pressures and stressors. Resilient states and societies can absorb shocks and transform and channel radical change or challenges through the political process, while maintaining political and social stability as well as preventing violence. In order to strengthen resilience against climate-fragility risks, actions have to be integrated across key policy fields, at different levels in society, and between different departments of each organisation involved in the effort. With resilience serving as an overarching objective, integration is likely to yield significant synergies and co-benefits even when the specific goals, approaches and tools are different.

This chapter looks at three key policy areas: climate change, development and humanitarian aid, and peacebuilding and conflict prevention. It outlines if and what key developments in these areas, such as the adoption of the SDGs and Paris Agreement, mean in terms of fostering integration across sectors and how they contribute in moving towards a global resilience agenda.

## The Sustainable Development Goals as a global resilience agenda

In September 2015, the UN Sustainable Development Summit adopted the Agenda 2030 containing 17 goals and 169 targets for sustainable development.<sup>59</sup> The road to it was paved with hard work for at least the previous three years.<sup>60</sup> More ambitious and comprehensive than the Millennium Development Goals adopted at the beginning of the century, as well as much better prepared, the SDGs are regarded as universal goals – i.e., applying to developed and developing countries alike. The adoption of this ambitious agenda for the next 15 years of global development reflected the continued capacity of the world’s governments to come together to identify common goals and the means to achieve them. At the same time, it inevitably invites questions about how it could be possible to implement this ambitious agenda.

It is too early as yet to discuss specific progress on the SDGs. Though there are some cases of action on the national level, with new ministries cross-departmental and interagency initiatives<sup>61</sup>, the possibility of global assessment and comparison depends on indicators that are still being worked out.<sup>62</sup> What is clear so far is that there will be extensive and highly demanding data requirements in order to get a clear picture on how such a complex, wide-ranging and far-reaching agenda moves forward.

While waiting on the wherewithal for measuring practical SDG achievements, it may well be generally agreed that the SDGs are succeeding in offering shape to some key debates on development, development aid, and international politics and policies. Some of these are of relevance in the climate security context. Most strikingly had the Summit failed to set Agenda 2030, that sense of international failure might well have made it

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59 UNGA 2015. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015: Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 21 October, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E) (accessed November 2016).

60 As reflected in the work of The High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, established by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2012 and co-chaired by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and British Prime Minister David Cameron. Its report, submitted in 2013, set the broad terms for the following two years of discussion on the international development agenda (UN 2013. *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development. The Report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda*, <http://www.post2015hlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/UN-Report.pdf> (accessed November 2016)).

61 See examples from Asia here: UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2016. *Achieving the SDGs: Asian Perspectives and Challenges*, speech by Shamshad Akhtar, 9 June, <http://www.unescap.org/speeches/achieving-sdgs-asian-perspectives-and-challenges> (accessed November 2016).

62 The fourth meeting of the Inter-agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators (IAEG-SDGs) was to be held from 15 to 18 November 2016 in Geneva, Switzerland (see <http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/meetings/iaeg-sdgs-meeting-04/>).

harder to get the Paris Agreement on Climate Change<sup>63</sup> agreed at COP 21 some ten weeks later.

The SDG agenda is broad in its scope, ambitious and reflects a number of principles that will be key for achieving the goals and implementing them effectively. First, its universality provides an umbrella for sustainable development in developed and developing countries. This universality opens the possibility for real partnerships that try to overcome the limits of international cooperation of the past. Second, the agenda rests on the understanding that development, peace, security, and climate change are closely interlinked. The inter-relationship between the different SDGs – between, for example, the goals on climate, food, water, urbanisation, governance, gender, education and poverty – is encouraging a policy discourse that seeks to conquer stove-piping.<sup>64</sup> The UN outcome document also stresses the integrated nature of the SDG agenda, the linkages between the goals and the need to overcome siloed approaches. It acknowledges that to implement this ambitious agenda and the commitments of other international agendas a new approach is needed.<sup>65</sup> Many analysts have long insisted on this as a necessary component of approaches and policies for tackling complex issues such as fragility and the linkages between climate change and insecurity.<sup>66</sup> Developing more proficiency in this mode of devising policy and practice will be key for figuring out the practicalities of handling climate related compound risks.

Nonetheless, it seems clear that, given the current state of knowledge and institutional awareness in most governments and international institutions, it remains too big an ask to get all departments of government, or EU Directorate-Generals, or UN departments to function as if part of one big integrated plan for climate-proof, peace-positive sustainable development. To put together such plans would be an overwhelmingly complex undertaking, especially for governments that are experiencing fragility and conflict. Here is the nub of the problem: integration is essential but difficult for all states and effectively impossible for some. This underlines the necessity to use integration to realize synergies between the different SDGs. How far reaching these synergies

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63 UNFCCC 2015. *Adoption of the Paris Agreement*, 12 December 2015, <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf> (accessed November 2016).

64 Le Blanc, D. 2015. Towards integration at last? The sustainable development goals as a network of targets. UN DESA Working Paper 141, [http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2015/wp141\\_2015.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2015/wp141_2015.pdf) (accessed November 2016).

65 UNGA 2015. *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*, 21 October, [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E) (accessed November 2016).

66 Smith, D. and Vivekananda, J. 2009. *Climate change, conflict and fragility: understanding the linkages, shaping effective responses*, London, International Alert; Rüttinger, L., et al., *op. cit.*; Mobjörk, M., et al., *op. cit.*

might be is clear from a recent analysis of climate actions planned as part of the Paris Agreement, showing that they align with at least 154 of the 169 SDG targets.<sup>67</sup>

## Paris Agreement

As with the UN Sustainable Development Summit, the road to the Paris Climate Summit in December (the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP 21) was paved with hard work. There were multiple grounds for scepticism about whether it would succeed, not least because of the dispiriting failure of COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the last time that a breakthrough to a new global agreement was attempted.<sup>68</sup> It was a major achievement by the UNFCCC secretariat, the French Government hosting the conference, and climate diplomacy in general to find a way through the tangle of competing and contrasting interests and avoid the problems that derailed the Copenhagen process in 2009. The achievement was based in part on the long-term work of the IPCC to establish the scientific consensus about climate change, how it was unfolding, why, and with what effects.<sup>69</sup> More broadly, there had also been a striking effort to mobilize global opinion, perhaps most dramatically demonstrated by the issuance of the Papal Encyclical *Laudato Si'* in May 2015.<sup>70</sup> Another important driver behind the successful result was the change from top down diplomacy, which characterised the lead-up to the Copenhagen summit, to a bottom up process in the run up to Paris. Key outputs of this process were the Intended National Determined Contributions (INDCs) of nearly all countries. These not only include the contributions to mitigating climate change but also measures to adapt to the various impacts. As a result, COP 21 stands, like the Sustainable Development Summit, as an example of the global community's continuing capacity to come together to sort out shared problems.

The following elements stand out when thinking about what the Paris Agreement on Climate Change means in terms of addressing climate-fragility risks.

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67 Northrop, E., et al. 2016. Examining the Alignment between the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions and the Sustainable Development Goals. Working Paper, Washington, DC. World Resources Institute, [http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/WRI\\_INDCs\\_v5.pdf](http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/WRI_INDCs_v5.pdf) (accessed November 2016).

68 Smith, D. 2010. 'Copenhagen: Recovering from the hangover', *Dan Smith's Blog*, 1 January, <https://dansmithsblog.com/2010/01/01/copenhagen-recovering-from-the-hangover/> (accessed November 2016).

69 IPCC, *op. cit.*

70 The Vatican 2015, *Encyclical Letter Laudato Si' of the Holy Father Francis on Care for our Common Home*, 24 May, [http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco\\_20150524\\_enciclica-laudato-si.html](http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html) (accessed November 2016).

First, by aiming towards a limitation of global temperature increase to 1.5°C instead of 2°C the member states followed the precautionary principle and, if achieved, this will lessen climate-fragility risks significantly. The graphic shows that in several important aspects, risk increases quite sharply between the 1.5° and 2°C thresholds.<sup>71</sup>

		1.5 °C	2 °C	
<b>Heat wave (warm spell) duration [month]</b>				
	Global	1.1 [1;1.3]	1.5 [1.4;1.8]	Tropical regions up to 2 months at 1.5 °C or up to 3 months at 2 °C
<b>Reduction in annual water availability [%]</b>				
	Mediterranean	9 [5;16]	17 [8;28]	Other dry subtropical regions like Central America and South Africa also at risk
<b>Increase in heavy precipitation intensity [%]</b>				
	Global	5 [4;6]	7 [5;7]	Global increase in intensity due to warming; high latitudes (>45 °N) and monsoon regions affected most.
	South Asia	7 [4;8]	10 [7;14]	
<b>Global sea-level rise</b>				
	in 2100 [cm]	40 [30;55]	50 [35;65]	1.5 °C end-of-century rate about 30 % lower than for 2 °C reducing long-term SLR commitment.
	2081–2100 rate [mm/yr]	4 [3;5.5]	5.5 [4;8]	
<b>Fraction of global coral reefs at risk of annual bleaching [Constant case, %]</b>				
	2050	90 [50;99]	98 [86;100]	Only limiting warming to 1.5 °C may leave window open for some ecosystem adaptation.
	2100	70 [14;98]	99 [85;100]	
<b>Changes in local crop yields over global and tropical present day agricultural areas including the effects of CO<sub>2</sub>-fertilization [%]</b>				
Wheat	Global	2 [-6;17]	0 [-8;21]	Projected yield reductions are largest for tropical regions, while high-latitude regions may see an increase. Projections not including highly uncertain positive effects of CO <sub>2</sub> -fertilization project reductions for all crop types of about 10 % globally already at 1.5 °C and further reductions at 2 °C.
	Tropics	-9 [-25;12]	-16 [-42;14]	
Maize	Global	-1 [-26;8]	-6 [-38;2]	
	Tropics	-3 [-16;2]	-6 [-19;2]	
Soy	Global	7 [-3;28]	1 [-12;34]	
	Tropics	6 [-3;23]	7 [-5;27]	
Rice	Global	7 [-17;24]	7 [-14;27]	
	Tropics	6 [0;20]	6 [0;24]	

However, at the moment the 1.5°C goal is still far from being reached. The first step to implementing what was agreed in Paris was to ratify the agreement. On 5 October 2016, the threshold of at least 55 parties and 55% of total global greenhouse emissions for entry into force of the Paris Agreement was achieved, with effect exactly one month

71 Schlessner, C.-F., et al. 2016. 'Differential climate impacts for policy-relevant limits to global warming: the case of 1.5 °C and 2 °C', *Earth System Dynamics*, 7, 345. The graphic shows a summary of key differences in climate impacts between a warming of 1.5°C and 2°C above pre-industrial and stylized 1.5°C and 2°C scenarios over the 21st century. Square brackets give the likely (66%) range.

later. At the time of the writing this report, the total number of countries that have ratified the agreement was 103 out of 197 signatories. Particularly noteworthy is that the major emitters, China, the US and the EU, ratified the agreement very quickly for an international agreement. This is encouraging even if the reason why the US has been able to ratify the agreement is because President Obama concluded it did not have to be ratified by the US Senate.<sup>72</sup> It remains to be seen if this will be challenged under the new presidency. When it comes to the ratification and implementation of the commitments, the issue of whether climate change is a high enough national priority is not only relevant in the US but other countries as well; the UK, for example, recently did away with its governmental Department of Energy and Climate Change.<sup>73</sup> To achieve the ambitious goal of 1.5°C, it will be necessary that all major emitters take swift and wide-ranging action to cut their emissions. If business-as-usual prevails, we will head for a temperature increase well beyond 1.5 degrees, with immense negative effects on climate-fragility risks.<sup>74</sup> At COP 22 in Marrakesh in November, the Climate Vulnerability Forum (CVF), a network of 45 countries including extremely vulnerable and fragile ones such as Afghanistan, South Sudan and Yemen, sent a strong signal to the major emitters by announcing a switch to 100 percent renewable energy by 2020.

A second element in terms of climate-fragility risks becomes even more important in the face of these challenges. The Paris Agreement firmly puts adaptation at the same level as mitigation. The Global South achieved a major breakthrough by making sure that adaptation is as much at the centre of the efforts to combat climate change as mitigation. The option – especially for most vulnerable countries – to include adaptation as element in the INDCs was an important element for the overall successful negotiation of the Paris Agreement. This means that the key elements of the adaptation agenda, analysed in detail in “A New Climate for Peace” such as vulnerability assessments, the development and implementation of National Adaptation Plan processes (NAPs) will take a prominent role throughout the upcoming implementation process.

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72 For contrasting views on the ratification, see “White House defends Obama evading Senate on Paris climate deal”, Washington Times, 29 August 2016: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/29/obama-will-bypass-senate-ratify-paris-climate-acc/>; and Gwynne Taraska and Andrew Light, ‘The World’s Biggest Carbon Emitters Officially Join The Paris Climate Deal (Updated): No, Obama isn’t “bypassing” Congress’, ThinkProgress 1 September 2016: <https://thinkprogress.org/us-china-to-formally-join-paris-agreement-b638ba9c2f9b#.hnbrmik6y>.

73 ‘Abolition of DECC “major setback for UK’s climate change efforts”’, The Guardian, 15 July 2016: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jul/15/decc-abolition-major-setback-for-uk-climate-change-efforts>.

74 Schellnhuber H. J., et al. 2016. Why the right climate target was agreed in Paris, *Nature Climate Change*, 6, 649–653.

A potentially meaningful third element is the continuation of the Loss and Damage discussion. It underlined the importance of thinking about the limits of mitigation and adaptation by providing a mechanism to address unavoidable loss and damage. Here, a task force on displacement is currently being established that is intended to develop recommendations on how to assist people displaced by climate-induced events. However this task force, like the rest of the Loss and Damage discussion and the accompanying Warsaw Mechanism institutional structure, is subject to an overall review until the end of the decade so the overall relevance for strengthening a global resilience agenda remains to be seen.

## World Humanitarian Summit

The first World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) was held in Istanbul on May 23 and 24, 2016.<sup>75</sup> Convened by United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, it was heralded as a once in a generation opportunity to reset the conversation and put into practice the newfound understanding that if conflict, disasters and climate are interlinked, so too must be our processes for dealing with them.

The WHS was a necessary acknowledgement that the context of humanitarian operations has changed, far exceeding the coping capacity of the existing humanitarian systems. Background documents to the summit acknowledged that crises are becoming more complex, more conflictual and more protracted. Increasingly climate change driven extremes such as droughts, floods and typhoons are converging with other pressures such as widening inequality, rapid urbanisation, and political instability. As a result, more countries are slipping into fragility and outright conflict.<sup>76</sup>

Whilst the outcomes of the Summit did not meet the ambition of reform of the humanitarian system to be able to address complex risks, four particular outcomes can be seen to offer new opportunities for better engagement on climate-fragility risks. First, and the most concrete outcome of the summit, the top 30 donors and aid agencies signed a so-called “Grand Bargain” to make aid more efficient. This included harmonising donor proposals and reporting, reducing overhead costs, introducing collective needs assessments, and earmarking less funding to specific projects.

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75 See [www.worldhumanitariansummit.org](http://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org)

76 UN 2016. One humanity: shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary General for the World Humanitarian Summit, High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing 2016. Too important to fail – addressing the humanitarian financing gap. Report to the United Nations Secretary General, World Humanitarian Summit secretariat 2015. Restoring Humanity: Synthesis of the Consultation Process for the World Humanitarian Summit.

In principle, the Grand Bargain offers greater scope for flexible, cross-sectoral, multi-risk focused interventions.

The second important outcome was to promote localisation in preference to top-down humanitarian interventions. This could allow greater opportunity for understanding the knock-on consequences of climate fragility and conflict risks, local power dynamics and the trade-offs between different risk and resilience factors affected by a possible intervention, and for this understanding to feed into the design of an intervention.

Third, whereas the critical issue of investing in prevention and risk mitigation made little progress at other global processes such as Sendai in March 2016, in Istanbul it was inched forward. Several new initiatives reflect a greater consensus around the need to shift focus. The finance ministers of the Vulnerable 20 Group launched, alongside the World Bank and the UN, a new partnership to help their countries better prepare for shocks, including better access to risk analysis, contingency plans and social protection schemes. However, in the current political climate, the appetite across the major donors to invest in the inherent uncertainty of preventative action does not seem likely to meet the rhetoric from the Summit.

Lastly, the global risk platform was initiated at the WHS to map and bring together existing risk, vulnerability and threat analysis initiatives into one global community of practice.<sup>77</sup> The platform aims to promote collaboration, transparency and accountability by developing common policies and standards and by enabling open-source data. It is also intended to help establish risk thresholds that are specific to different national and sub-national contexts and that reflect each one's social and political realities as well as environmental issues. The tool is in development. It remains to be seen how effectively any risk analysis emerging from this platform can be translated into preventive action, given the absence of any inter-agency coordination or institutional reform to enable joint action.

In spite of emphasis placed by the WHS on complex risks, there is a need to be more systematic about capitalising on this opportunity. While humanitarian actors cannot prevent or end violent conflict, they can contribute to a reduction of the risk of violence and fragility. Humanitarian assistance can affect conflict dynamics negatively, whether through targeting of beneficiaries, procurement and the distribution of resources. Conversely, they can help build resilience, develop capacities and enhance social cohesion – not necessarily by changing what aid is provided but by changing how it is done. The process will consolidate and reinforce humanitarian principles. There is, however, a long way to go to ensure that the outcomes agreed by humanitarian agencies and aid donors are translated into practice. What the summit also showed is

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77 Also see <http://agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/3847>

that most efforts concentrated on overcoming the divide between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, while the links to peacebuilding, disaster risk reduction and climate change were much weaker.

## Habitat III

In 2016 cities and urbanisation gained renewed international recognition: most notably through a stand-alone Sustainable Development Goal (11) to make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable and at the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) that was held in Quito, Ecuador on 17-20 October 2016. These conferences take place every 20 years and there has been a significant paradigm change between the first conference in 1976 and Habitat III. While urbanization was initially seen as a problem – associated with poverty, uncontrolled growth of slums, and pollution – a shift has occurred towards recognizing that well planned, built and managed cities can be drivers of sustainable development, economic growth and inclusiveness.<sup>78</sup>

The Habitat III process was marked by extensive negotiations among member states, and inclusive consultations with a wide range of stakeholders. The outcome of this process was enshrined in the New Urban Agenda, a text that elucidates a coherent vision for sustainable cities, and links sustainable urban development to the achievement of the SDGs. This new agenda is built on the recognition that cities are not only important *sites* of sustainable development, but also as key *actors* for sustainable development. Local authorities organized in interest groups such as the Global Taskforce of Local and Regional governments increasingly spoke with one voice to call for a “seat at the table”.<sup>79</sup> While this demand was ultimately denied, the Habitat III process nonetheless stands out as the first time that direct consultations between local authorities and member states took place in a UN context.<sup>80</sup>

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78 Citiscope 2015. *What's the history of the Habitat process?*, <http://citiscope.org/habitatIII/explainer/2015/06/whats-history-habitat-process> (accessed November 2016); Kimmelman, M. 2016. 'The Kind of Thinking Cities Need', *New York Times*, 30 October, [http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/30/opinion/sunday/the-kind-of-thinking-cities-need.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/30/opinion/sunday/the-kind-of-thinking-cities-need.html?_r=0) (accessed November 2016).

79 Scruggs, G. 2016. 'So, what's new in the final draft New Urban Agenda?', *Citiscope*, 14 September, <http://citiscope.org/habitatIII/news/2016/09/so-whats-new-final-draft-new-urban-agenda> (accessed November 2016).

80 Scruggs, G. 2016. 'Cities clamor for a seat at the table of the UN countries club', *Citiscope*, 18 May, <http://citiscope.org/habitatIII/news/2016/05/cities-clamour-seat-table-un-countries-club> (accessed November 2016).

As a cross-cutting theme of the Agenda, “building urban resilience” is one of its guiding principles. Accordingly, the Agenda emphasizes that changes in the way cities are planned, financed, designed, built, governed and managed can foster resilience. However, despite this rather encompassing vision, resilience was primarily discussed in the context of climate change and disaster resilience and emphasis placed on transforming urban infrastructure, housing, planning and design as tools to achieve resilience. This is a rather narrow conception that misses a broader range of environmental, social, economic and political pressures and stressors that may contribute to fragility and undermine resilience. For example, the concept of “fragile cities” has in recent years been used to refer to the destabilizing effect that can emerge in cities where various global pressures – such as climate impacts, rapid and unplanned urbanization, social inequalities, criminality and unemployment – converge<sup>81</sup>, but does not play a role in the New Urban Agenda. Moreover, despite the general recognition of the relevance of urban resilience in the New Urban Agenda, there is a long way to go to translate this into concrete actions. In general, initial commitments for initiatives that support the implementation of the New Urban Agenda are lagging behind expectations, as member states appear to be focusing their efforts on the SDGs and the Paris Agreement.

## G7 action on climate fragility risks

The G7 foreign ministries continued their efforts to address climate-fragility risks in 2016. In 2015 under the German presidency, the G7 foreign ministers had welcomed the report *A New Climate for Peace* (commissioned by the G7) and decided to set up and task a high-level working group to evaluate the recommendations of the report. Under the Japanese presidency, the G7 foreign ministers reaffirmed their commitment to address climate-fragility risks collectively and repeated this stance in the final Joint Communiqué. They endorsed a quick entry into force of the Paris Agreement by all parties and emphasized the role of the G7 in managing climate fragility risks, including them in both foreign and domestic policies. In this context, they welcomed an internal evaluation of the G7 report and renewed the mandate of the high-level working group on climate-change and fragility for another two years. Following up, the German Foreign Office organised a G7 expert workshop on joint risk assessment in October 2016.

At the same time, G7 members also took action on the national level, most notably Canada and the US. On 21 September 2016, President Obama announced a new Presidential Memorandum on climate change and national security. The memo continued the president’s efforts to embed responses to climate change into the

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81 Muggah, R. 2016. ‘Where are the world’s most fragile cities?’, Thompson Reuters Foundation News, 12 September, <http://news.trust.org/item/20160912112924-6sk7n> (accessed November 2016).

mechanics of the federal government. It directed 20 federal agencies to consider the national security implications of climate change and establish a working group that will develop a Climate Change and National Security Action Plan and Implementation Plan for the federal government. Within 90 days of the Memorandum announcement, the group will identify priorities, develop ways that climate science and intelligence can inform national security planning, and ultimately produce a Climate Change and National Security Action Plan. While this was a very encouraging sign, it remains to be seen if and how it will continue under the new presidency.

Canada has also shown increased interest and engagement on climate-fragility issues. Upon entering office in November 2015, Canada's new government indicated that climate change would be a new focal point with the appointment of a Minister for Environment and Climate Change. Prime Minister Trudeau rallied provincial premiers and political party leaders to engage in COP 21 in Paris, and within his government, he has asked his ministers to work together on the issue across defence, development, foreign affairs and public safety minister. In March 2016, the Canadian Government's Global Affairs Canada (a department that includes the country's foreign affairs, trade and development ministers) held a conference on "Climate Change and Security: Fragile States." The conference speech by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stéphane Dion, drew directly on the G7 report, *A New Climate for Peace*, and explicitly focused on the links between climate change and state fragility. The conference followed on the heels of the bi-lateral agreement between the United States and Canada to expand cooperation on matters of climate and security. Practical action on this in Canada has so far been limited. However, climate security impacts are increasingly evident in four key areas of relevance: demands on Canada's military in responding to climate related humanitarian disasters; the spill-over from foreign climate-related conflict; challenges to Arctic sovereignty; and domestic natural disasters. These could act as a catalyst for more practical action beyond the policy rhetoric.

In the beginning of 2017, Japan will hand over the G7 working group to the Italian presidency. While concrete results of the working group, for example in the form of joint G7 projects, are still missing, it is encouraging that the G7 has remained committed. This was not inevitable since the G7 is very much driven by its presidencies and lacks an institutional structure of its own. In fact, the creation of the G7 working group on climate change and fragility was itself an institutional innovation. Leadership by the presidency and the G7 members will be needed to identify the next steps and fill the process with life. True success will be registered if and when joint G7 action is taken beyond the working group process.

## UN Peacebuilding Architecture/Institutions

The UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, reporting in 2004, argued that there was 'a key institutional gap: there is no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid State collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition from war to peace.'<sup>82</sup> To fill the gap, the Panel proposed (and in 2005 the UN as a whole agreed) to establish a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) together with two other bodies – the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Together these became known as the UN's 'peacebuilding architecture'.

The architecture has been subject to various reviews in the decade-plus since being established. After a slow start the PBF has generally received positive reviews but the PBC hasn't fared quite as well. Most notably, a review by member states in 2010 pulled no punches in expressing disappointments that were widely felt among diplomats in New York at the limited role and effectiveness of the PBC. Criticisms were explicit and even harsh, in the hope that they would function as a wake-up call.<sup>83</sup> In 2015 a further review by an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) commented that hopes for the effectiveness of the PBC are now even weaker than in 2010 and argued the case for moving forward with a broader concept of what constitutes the 'peacebuilding architecture'.<sup>84</sup>

The report's recommendations build on the concept of 'sustaining peace' – a function and a goal that is relevant before, during and after violent conflict. This contrasts with the concept of peacebuilding when it first emerged in *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 as a purely post-conflict activity.<sup>85</sup> In fact, as the report points out, the UN Security Council in 2001 declared that peacebuilding aims at 'preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or the continuation of armed conflict'.<sup>86</sup> Many have since followed that approach, removing the concept of peacebuilding from the limits of being purely post-conflict. But as the AGE report also points out, the UN Security Council still refers to 'post-

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82 UN 2004. A more secure world: Our shared responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel Report on Threats Challenges and Change, New York, para 261.

83 UNGA/UNSC 2010. *Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*, 21 July 2010, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PB%20Review%20S2010%20393.pdf> (accessed November 2016).

84 UN 2015. *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace : Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*, 29 June, [http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/united\\_nations\\_challenges\\_sustaining\\_peace.pdf](http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/united_nations_challenges_sustaining_peace.pdf) (accessed November 2016).

85 UNSG 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, 17 June 1992, <http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-un-secretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439> (accessed November 2016).

86 UN 2015, *op. cit.*, para 25.

conflict peacebuilding<sup>87</sup> and argues that the new term is required because it puts more emphasis on prevention and on the link between peacebuilding and development. This new terminology and emphasis also offers – at least in theory – more entry points for linking peacebuilding with efforts to reduce climate-fragility risks. However, it has to be noted that the links between climate change and conflict were largely missing from the report and the discussions.

Whether the terminological shift will have the effect intended by the AGE report is arguable. The report's core output is not so much the seven recommendations for how the PBC should improve its work but rather the ten that aim to strengthen the peacebuilding capacity of the UN system taken as a whole. All are aimed at threading peacebuilding (or sustaining peace) as a core function of the United Nations as a whole through all of its relevant activities and departments.

Important though the AGE report is as an overview of how peacebuilding is handled within the UN and how it could in principle be strengthened, the practical import of these recommendations is not clear one year after the report was delivered. It is more than likely that most of the UN system will be little touched by this ambitious agenda, whose greatest effects will be in the PBC and PBSO themselves. Beyond that, the question is whether there will be change in those sections of the UN that are deeply engaged with that area of activity – such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operation, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and relevant parts of the Department of Political Affairs and the UN Development Programme. The work of each is affected by climate fragility issues and each can have an influence on how member states respond to the challenges.

## UN Security Council

Climate change as a security concern has been discussed on a regular basis in the UN Security Council since the first open debate held in 2007, chaired by the UK. This debate was followed by a report by the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, in 2009, and a General Assembly Resolution on climate change was adopted the same year (UN 2009; UN A/RES/63/281). In 2011 a second open debate was held in the UN Security Council initiated by Germany, which resulted in a request from the Security Council to the Secretary General to start providing 'contextual information' on possible security implications of climate change in the reports the Secretary General presents to the council (UN S/PV.6587, 2011). Although both these two first debates were somewhat contentious, the Security Council continued to discuss the security implications of climate change in the more informal Arria-Formula meetings (in 2013 and 2015).

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87 *Id.*, para 26.

In July 2015 the Security Council held an open debate on the “Maintenance of international peace and security: peace and security challenges facing small island developing states”.<sup>88</sup> This debate was held at the initiative of New Zealand.<sup>89</sup> One key issue was sea-level rise and other adverse impacts of climate change which pose serious threats to many small island developing states’ survival and viability. Another issue highlighted was the urgent need to enhance international cooperation and action to address the unique vulnerabilities of small island states. Besides these meetings there was also a briefing in May 2016 on the impact of climate change and desertification on peace and security in the Sahel.

Thus the discussion of climate change as a security issue in the Security Council continued and grew in 2015 and 2016. It is no longer constrained to be an issue of its own, but receives greater attention also with respect to how climate-related security risks interacts with other issues. This is a first step in shaping integrated policy responses and thus corresponding to a movement towards a global resilience agenda. Looking to the future, this momentum could be used to try to push the Security Council to go beyond a no-regret strategy and do-no-harm approach and instead take a more pro-active role. Under the new Secretary General and with new members of the Security Council such as Sweden and the Netherlands, which have identified climate security as a priority, there might be an opportunity to push this pro-active and preventive agenda forward.

## African Union

The African Union’s Peace and Security Council held its first open session on climate change under the title “Climate Change: State fragility, peace and security in Africa” at its 585th meeting on March 30 2016. The debate reflected the collective acknowledgement that climate change, peace and security in Africa are inextricably linked. It stressed the need for all Member States to strengthen their national resilience capacities. The Council also acknowledged that climate change in Africa, especially in pastoral communities, is a potential trigger of inter-communal violence; it therefore called on Member States to share international expertise and coordinate international efforts in mitigating the impacts of climate change. Particularly with regard to early warning and conflict prevention efforts, the Council stressed the importance of mainstreaming climate change into all of the AU Commission’s activities. It requested

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88 UNSG 2015. *7499th meeting*, 30 July, New York, [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_pv\\_7499.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_7499.pdf) (accessed November 2016).

89 UNSG 2015. Letter dated 15 July 2015 from the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, July 2016, New York, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1522237.pdf> (accessed November 2016).

the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) to intensify its cooperation with early warning centres of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs) in order to build capacity of Member States in this regard. Concluding the debate, the Council agreed to hold an annual open session on climate change.

As with developments in the UN Security Council, this reflects the fact that climate change is increasingly affecting the security of African states. It represents a significant step for the African Union to acknowledging climate change as more than a development issue. The concrete actions outlined by the Peace and Security Council are encouraging, but issues arise over the implementation capacity of the African Union Commission. This is a window of opportunity for countries and donors to proactively offer partnerships and external assistance.

## EU Climate Diplomacy strategy and action on climate-fragility risks

The European Union has been one of the most active international actors in the field of climate security. As far back as 2008, in a paper titled “Climate Change and International Security”, the then High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and the European Commission recognized climate change as a threat multiplier and concluded it had to be part of its foreign and security policy. Over the years, the European Union, and in particular the Foreign Affairs Council and the European External Action Service, developed a strategy for its climate diplomacy efforts. As part of this strategy development process, the nexus between climate change, natural resources, fragility and conflict became one of three central pillars for the EU’s climate diplomacy.

In summer 2016, the EU launched its new Global Strategy, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*.<sup>90</sup> It “sets out the EU’s core interests and principles for engaging in the world” and aims at a broad and integrated approach for the EU’s foreign policy. As part of the Strategy, the EU is intending to broaden its climate diplomacy approach and integrate it into its overall foreign and security policy thinking. For example, the new document recognizes the strategic importance of climate change as a root cause of conflict and a “threat multiplier that catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement”. It calls for pre-emptive peacebuilding and diplomacy and emphasises the need to increase resilience, in particular regarding energy and the environment. For the latter, it also highlights the risks linked to the transition to a more sustainable and green economic model, for example the impacts these transition processes might have on fossil fuel producing countries. This is remarkable as its

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90 European Union 2016. *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy*, <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en> (accessed November 2016).

predecessor, the European Security Strategy released in 2003, contained virtually no mention of climate security; it therefore illustrates that climate change has firmly established itself as a security and foreign policy issue on the European level. The next step will be to translate this strategy into concrete action, for example looking at how this topic will be taken up by the EU's delegations and as part of its strategic bilateral partnerships. Priority areas for these efforts will most likely be the energy sector and its development cooperation.

In the field of development cooperation, the EU is also starting to work on addressing climate-fragility risks directly. Financed by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, the EU awarded a project to UNEP in 2016 to develop a methodology to assess climate-fragility risks on the national and local level. Based on pilot assessments, the project will test interventions that combine climate change adaptation and peacebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected countries. This is an encouraging development but the key question remains the capacity to integrate and cooperate within as well as between different governments and inter-governmental organisations. If this is not enhanced, obstacles will persist for the global resilience agenda.<sup>91</sup>

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91 Mobjörk, M., et al., *op.cit.*

# Conclusions and Recommendations

This report sets out to consider developments in climate-fragility risks since the completion of the much larger report, *A New Climate For Peace*, in April 2015. In short, the summary conclusion is that the risks identified in the earlier report persist: the trend of an increasing number of armed conflicts has continued and the capacities of local, national and international actors to manage specific crisis and conflicts are under growing pressure. In a world of deepening geopolitical rivalries the increasing impacts of climate change and number of crisis and conflicts create a deeply unsettling new normal. At the same time, and much more positively, the international community has shown that it can act together to address global problems.

As always, the devil is in the details – specifically, the details of implementation. At this stage in the evolution of climate and environmental diplomacy over the past 25 years, the key issue is implementation. Deficiencies in terms of ambition aside, without respecting and carrying the new global agreements out, it will not be possible to push the global resilience agenda forward. Two global agreements in 2015 set the framework for immediate work on global resilience – the Paris Agreement on climate change and the adoption of Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals. There are three key challenges to that framework and its practical implementation. The first, on which much of this report has focused, is the importance of integration. The point of integration is that, while parallel actions by different agencies (and different departments within them) may be directed at the right goals, opportunities for synergy will be lost, the probability of duplicating effort is quite high, and the risks in terms of unintended negative effects increase. Integration, in short, is an efficiency measure.

Shifts in rhetoric's and terminology on climate in relation to security risks, while often important, are not real shifts yet. In addition to describing the problem differently, we also need to address it more effectively. In this vein, however, it is possible that the emphasis on integrated approaches, with which the community of thought on climate fragility risks is now very familiar, should be complemented by further qualities. It is noteworthy that US reports on the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and on Hurricane Katrina that devastated New Orleans in 2005 noted failures of imagination and initiative in defining

contingency planning and implementing the response.<sup>92</sup> What we still need is not simply an alignment of efforts between institutions but internal institutional reform as well.

The second challenge for the global resilience agenda lies in the realm of geopolitics. The sharpening of rivalries between the big players on the world stage and at regional levels in the Middle East and in East Asia is a potential source of difficulties in developing the cooperation needed both to fulfil Agenda 2030 and implement the Paris Agreement. It would not be a viable political agenda to insist on geopolitical rivalries taking second place to the requirements of planetary security. It sounds good as an ideal but would always falter when faced with the realities of rivalry. What is reasonable is to argue that environmental sustainability is now a geopolitical interest. It needs to be at least included in the calculations when working out the approach of diplomacy for relations between the big powers on the world stage and at regional levels. For the good of the environment, as part of planetary security, effort is needed on all sides to handle current geopolitical rivalries as peacefully, constructively and cooperatively as possible.

The third challenge lies at national level. Here, the rejection of climate science findings by President-elect Trump, if followed through in practice during his time in office, will offer encouragement to others who either reject climate science or deny the urgency of acting on its findings. If there is a roll back in key countries of the tenuous near-consensus on climate change that made the Paris Agreement possible, that will inevitably have a direct effect on the potential for implementing a global resilience agenda.

On the basis of this survey and discussion of recent developments in climate-fragility risk and response over the past year and a half, we offer the following three recommendations and priorities for the next 12 months to governments and other actors who recognise the risks of climate-fragility:

1. **Put increased effort into climate diplomacy.** The developing community of thought and practice on the new resilience agenda must act in a way that does not assume we have won all the key arguments. Or, in other words, this community has to prepare to win the arguments again and again. In the face of recent developments, foreign policy makers will have to continue and further increase their climate diplomacy efforts in order to maintain the momentum established by the

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92 Lindberg, H. and Sundelius, B. 2012. 'Whole-of-society disaster resilience: the Swedish way', in: *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook*, ed. Kamien, D., 2nd edition, Columbus, OH, McGraw-Hill, 1299. NB: Helena Lindberg is Director General of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The reports the authors refer to are *The 9/11 Commission Report* of 2004; the White House report, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, completed in February 2006; and from the US House of Representatives in the same year, *A Failure of Initiative. Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina*.

Paris Agreement. Climate diplomacy should focus increasingly on implementation of what has been agreed and on achieving the enabling measures so implementation can proceed. A key action here is to stop decreasing and start increasing the number of dedicated foreign policy staff working on climate fragility risks.

2. **Protect the gains that have been registered so far.** Whenever there is progress on the climate change and climate-fragility agendas, there is a risk of slippage, of losing some of the ground that has been gained. We need to find ways to lock achievements in so as to maintain momentum. A challenge in this regard is the lack of institutionalisation when it comes to building resilience against climate-fragility risks. Up until now, climate-fragility risks are neither integrated in the existing institutional landscape, for example the large international development organisations such as the World Bank and UNDP, nor does this topic have its own institutional framework. A starting point could be to create an international hub that can provide analysis and advice on climate-fragility risks.
3. **Continue to focus on integration and enabling strategies for institutional change management.** To fulfil the framework established by the Paris Agreement and Agenda 2030, there is no way around integration. Linking action across agendas and within them will be key to foster the global resilience agenda. Implementation of the Paris Agreement and Agenda 2030 also requires strategies for managing change in the governmental and inter-governmental organisations and agencies that are most involved in the work. The Agenda 2030 can serve as a vehicle to develop and pilot strategies and processes of institutional change management. How to foster the global resilience agenda and achieve integration was spelled out in detail in *A New Climate For Peace*. The recommendations given then are still valid and can serve as entry points for action.

It is a truism to state that a set of recommendations like these – a task like the one that faces us to address climate-fragility risks – requires leadership. In times when there is a real risk of roll back and losing what has been achieved, leadership will have to be provided by all committed actors. It is the collective responsibility of governments, inter-governmental organisations, NGOs, research centres and individuals who have signed up to take these ideas forward.