SPECIAL ISSUE
CLIMATE CHANGE, SECURITY, AND CONFLICT

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Our vision is a world beyond war by 2030 and humanity united by a global system of peace with justice.

Our mission is to advance the Global Peace System by supporting, developing and collaborating with peacebuilding efforts in all sectors of society.

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Peace and Conflict Studies (henceforth: Peace Science) has emerged as an academic discipline with its own graduate programs, handbooks, research tools, theories, associations, journals, and conferences. As with most scientific communities, the slow migration of academic knowledge into practical application becomes a limiting factor of a field’s growth, its impact, and the overall effectiveness of its practitioners.

The expanding academic field of Peace Science continues to produce high volumes of significant research that often goes unnoticed by practitioners, the media, activists, public policy-makers, and other possible beneficiaries. This is unfortunate, because Peace Science ultimately should inform the practice on how to bring about peace.

The research and theory needed to guide peace workers to produce more enduring and positive peace, not only more peace studies, have come to stay. Bridging the gap between the peace movement moralism and foreign policy pragmatism is a major challenge facing everyone who seeks to achieve peace on Earth. (Johan Galtung and Charles Webel)

To address this issue, the War Prevention Initiative has created the Peace Science Digest as a way to disseminate top selections of research and findings from the field’s academic community to its many beneficiaries.

The Peace Science Digest is formulated to enhance awareness of scholarship addressing the key issues of our time by making available an organized, condensed, and comprehensible summary of this important research as a resource for the practical application of the field’s current academic knowledge.
Dear Readers,

This past October, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a report alerting us all to the likely effects of inaction in the face of mounting global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—catastrophic events that could transpire as soon as 2040 if global emissions continue on their current trajectory and global temperatures rise even “just” 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. These events would be accompanied by severe economic consequences: the report notes an estimated 54 trillion USD in damages. Climate change is no longer a far-off eventuality; it is happening now in our communities around the world: historically large wildfires in California, destructive storms in the Caribbean and in the southeastern United States, droughts in East Africa and Central America, to name a few examples.

For our grandchildren, for our children, and even now for ourselves, the stakes are high, and global action is urgent. But why is the Peace Science Digest devoting an entire special issue to climate change? What does climate change have to do with war prevention and peace? There are a few levels on which we might consider the connections. The most obvious is perhaps the role climate change may play in instigating violent conflict (a relationship the first and second analyses in this special issue critically examine). Although climate-induced resource scarcity or extreme weather events do not automatically bring about violent conflict, there are certainly good arguments to be made for how environmental stressors can create conditions that make violent conflict more likely or that may exacerbate existing conflicts—Darfur and Syria, but also the water dimension of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, come to mind. But, more broadly, climate change can itself be a form of insecurity. In other words, the same concern for human security that informs a commitment to war prevention and peace therefore also informs a commitment to mitigating climate change.

Furthermore, framing climate change as a security issue helps us see it as the urgent issue that it is, one that will require a monumental global effort on a scale like that exerted during World War II. The other level on which we might consider a connection is through the nonviolent resistance and peacemaking activities necessary to wean the global economy off fossil fuels and to negotiate global agreements that can facilitate action in this direction. Lessons learned from nonviolent resistance and negotiation scholarship can contribute to better strategizing—and therefore stronger climate movements and more effective climate agreements, both of which can pressure and constrain powerful actors (countries, corporations) who need to get on board now (see the third analysis in this special issue on the Paris Agreement). Furthermore, the resource scarcity exacerbated by climate change provides an opportunity for smart conflict management strategies, as indicated in the fourth analysis here on transboundary water cooperation.

Discussions about climate change—and efforts to both mitigate it and adapt to it—bring to our attention questions about how to address not only direct violence but also structural violence. As most of the research examined in this issue highlights in one way or another, we need to consider who overwhelmingly bears the costs of climate change, as well as the costs of reining it in. Who is more vulnerable, and who shoulders more of the burden? Climate action must be taken with careful attention to the distribution of costs across society and in tandem with action to transform existing inequalities (see the fifth analysis to consider the gender dimensions of these issues of power and inequality). These considerations are also important at the global level, where questions about how to justly, equitably distribute the costs of cutting GHG emissions have dominated climate negotiations, with industrialized countries bearing responsibility for the overwhelming majority of GHG emissions up to this point and developing countries becoming responsible for increasingly high emission levels as their economies industrialize.
Awareness of these distributional issues must inform—but cannot hold back—action to fundamentally transform our global consumption and emission patterns. Such action is possible—if often restrained by politics. But at least politics is human-made and, ultimately, within our control. One new initiative in the U.S. Congress—the Green New Deal, a plan for a just transition to 100% renewable energy by 2030—is evidence that smart policy can be good for the climate and good for regular folks, too. Action is being taken on so many other levels, as well, by municipalities, universities, community groups, major corporations, and so on. If you want to be inspired and energized to take part, see the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) platform online: http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/map.html.

We hope the research discussed in this special issue informs a cascade of activism and policy-making to avert the worst eventualities of climate change and to create a world that is more secure and more just for all of us.

Your Peace Science Digest Editorial Team,
We recommend:

https://outrider.org/climate-change/articles/climate-change-national-security-threat/

Yale Program on Climate Change Communication
http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/

The War and Environment Reader
https://justworldbooks.com/books/war-environment-reader/

Seeing Systems: Peace, Justice and Sustainability
https://nwei.org/discussion-course-books/seeing-systems-peace-justice/

Climate Change and Risk Program of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
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Exploring the Relationships Between Climate Change, Migration, and Violent Conflict

When climate change is framed as a security threat, it is often due to assumptions about how changes in the climate will cause mass migration, which will itself precipitate violent conflict. Major institutions—the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the European Union among them—have thus presented “climate migration” as a serious concern for global security. The authors point out, however, that there is little evidence to back up the assertion that there is a simple, straightforward relationship between climate change, migration, and violent conflict. The aim of this research, therefore, is to investigate the plausible relationships between climate change and migration, on the one hand, and migration and violent conflict, on the other. To do this, the authors review recent scholarship in both areas and then develop their own tentative model.

A consensus largely emerged in an earlier body of environmental conflict scholarship that environmental factors like resource scarcity do not directly or by themselves cause violent conflict but rather “can contribute to the likelihood of violent conflict” in conjunction with other factors like “ethnic polarization, weak political structures and low levels of economic development,” with migration being one of the pathways by which environmental factors can facilitate violent conflict. Research on migration suggests that environmental factors are just one among many (including economic, political, demographic, and social) drivers of migration. Furthermore, while migration is one way climate change can facilitate violent conflict, it can also be seen as a potential “buffer” between climate change and violent conflict, insofar as it may “alleviate the pressures of climate change” in some cases. Nonetheless, the traditional way of understanding the relationships between these factors follows this logic: climate change → environmental change/scarcity → migration → violent conflict. The authors argue that the existing model is inadequate, insofar as related empirical evidence is inconclusive and/or contradictory and the model itself is too simplistic.

The authors begin to complicate our understanding of these matters by first exploring the relationship between climate change and migration, noting the importance of vulnerability and adaptation to understanding variations in climate change’s influence on migration. When people are vulnerable...
to climate change—something that is most likely when they are directly dependent on renewable natural resources—their livelihoods and health are affected, potentially contributing to instability and mass migration to “more resource-rich areas.” Adaptation—“activities designed to cope with negative consequences of climate change”—has an ambivalent relationship with migration, as migration could be seen as a form of adaptation to climate change or as evidence of its failure, largely depending on whether and to what extent the migration in question is voluntary or forced. Both vulnerability and adaptation, then, bring to light issues related to power and inequality. Depending on one's level of vulnerability and, inversely, adaptive capacity, one might respond to environmental stresses with passive acceptance, active in-place adaptation, or migration (forced or voluntary).

The authors then identify four types of migrants who may be affected by climate change, distinguished by various factors including the distance traveled, the length of time in the receiving region, and their economic strategies once there, as well as how voluntary or forced their migration is: 1) “ecological-economic migrants,” 2) “climate disaster refugees,” 3) “permanent climate refugees,” and 4) “climate-affected migrants.”

Turning to the relationship between migration and violent conflict, the authors take into consideration the type of “climate migrant” and the characteristics of the receiving country/society to assess how likely violent conflict might be. The most problematic scenarios are those where either permanent climate refugees or climate-affected migrants—those most likely to compete for scarce resources in the host area—arrive in areas with extreme resource scarcity, a recent history of violent conflict, or exclusionary identities, especially when these migrants might shift the identity balance in an existing identity conflict. There is a low likelihood of violent conflict with eco-economic migrants or climate disaster refugees, as the former generally will choose areas that are more receptive to migrants, and the latter generally will have access to humanitarian assistance and will stay in the host region only temporarily.

In summary, the authors argue that “the potential of climate migration to lead or contribute to violent conflict” is affected by the characteristics of both the population movement and the receiving region, including its economic situation and its views on the integration of refugees and migrants.


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Continued reading:

How Climate Change Is Driving Central American Migrants to the United States

The Unseen Driver Behind the Migrant Caravan: Climate Change

None of Us Deserve Citizenship

U.S. Troops Could Remain on Border Into 2019, Officials Say
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE

The migrant caravan that recently arrived at the southern U.S. border is often understood to be caused by the violence racking Central America, and it is to a large extent—but the picture is more complex than this. Central America has been ravaged by unusually strong hurricanes and droughts, in turn, throwing off normal growing patterns and pushing many small-scale farmers into the cities. Displaced and food insecure, these families or individuals find themselves more vulnerable than they might otherwise be to gang violence. As suggested by the present research, their immediate reason for migrating out of their home country could be another migration driver, such as violence, but an underlying cause could be food insecurity aggravated by climate change; as such, they fall somewhere between the “ecological-economic migrants” and “permanent climate refugees” identified in the research. Their migration to the U.S. border is a survival strategy, as they are simply looking for a safe place for themselves and/or their families to live where they can earn a living. Also as discussed in the research, the decision to migrate reflects existing inequalities and power imbalances in their home countries, as some people in Guatemala, Honduras, or El Salvador, for instance, are more susceptible to changes in the resource base than others, due to social and economic identities and hierarchies.

Finally, the question of whether such climate-related migration will lead to violence very much depends on the conditions in the receiving country—in this case, the U.S. (but also Mexico). The research notes that violence is more likely when the receiving country has a strong exclusionary identity, making citizens unwilling to accept migrants and fearful of an “erosion of traditions, customs and institutions by an influx of migrants from another cultural background.” This characterization aptly describes the views of many people in the U.S. who, following Trump, insist on a border wall to keep migrants out, viewing them as dangerous criminals—or at the very least as undeserving of entry into the country. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s decision to militarize the U.S. response to the migrant caravan, by stationing U.S. troops on the border, blatantly escalates the encounter between those migrating from Central America and those “receiving” them—clear evidence that the likelihood of violence in response to “climate migration” depends as much on the conditions in the receiving country as on the migrants themselves.

TALKING POINTS

• The claim that there is a straightforward causal relationship between climate change, migration, and violent conflict is too simplistic.
• The characteristics of particular population movements in conjunction with the conditions in receiving countries together influence how likely it is that violent conflict will result.
• Different levels of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change are important factors influencing whether a group will migrate in response to environmental changes or resource scarcity.
• The scenarios most likely to result in violent conflict are those where either permanent climate refugees or climate-affected migrants—those most likely to compete for scarce resources—arrive in areas with extreme resource scarcity, a recent history of violent conflict, or exclusionary/anti-immigrant identities and ideologies, especially when these migrants might shift the identity balance in an existing identity conflict.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

One crucial insight that emerges from this research is that violent conflict is not an inevitable result of climate change, as climate change does not automatically lead to migration, and migration does not automatically lead to violent conflict. This finding does not, however, mean that we should be complacent about the security implications of climate change; rather, it reminds us that there are conditions that we (people, societies) can influence. Neither climate change nor violent conflict are simply “natural” phenomena. It is useful to remind ourselves, therefore, of that over which we do have control: the volume of greenhouse gases we are emitting into the atmosphere; the vulnerability of different groups of people to the effects of climate change and the presence or absence of effective adaptation infrastructure (physical, economic, social, and so on); the immigration policies in place to welcome (or deter) migrants; and the ideological and physical responses to immigrants when they arrive in one’s country (inclusive versus exclusive identities, a military or humanitarian response, and so on). These are all human-made problems—with human-made solutions.

For those of us in industrialized countries who act primarily as receiving regions (and who, it is worth adding, are historically responsible for the vast amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and therefore for the detrimental climate effects unfolding around the world), this research draws attention especially to immigration policies and their security implications. If violent conflict is more likely where exclusionary ideologies/identities exist and where military responses predominate, then it makes sense—even if just from a security perspective, but also as a matter of justice—to foster more welcoming and inclusive ideologies that will not pit “natives” and “migrants” against one another and to not treat what is essentially a humanitarian crisis as a military threat.

Finally, this research draws into focus how immigration policy and climate policy are fundamentally related. If (certain) U.S. citizens are worried about too many people coming across the U.S. border, perhaps they should focus their attention on strengthening the U.S.’s commitment to the Paris Agreement and weaning the global economy off fossil fuels rather than on building a wall.
Rethinking the Climate-Conflict Relationship

In 2016 and 2017, Eastern Africa experienced a drought that most experts believe to be linked to global climate change. Uganda, hit especially hard by dry weather, also experienced unseasonal flooding, a further indication of the abnormal weather patterns commonly attributed to climate change. These climate incidents, coupled with Uganda’s history of violent conflict, provide an opportunity for some researchers to suggest that climate change causes violence—a relationship cited by many as one of the most dangerous consequences of our changing climate. This relationship, however, is not so straightforward. According to the author, arguments over whether or not climate change causes violence draw our attention to problems of the future and distract from current realities and the events that led up to them. They may also lead us to ignore a cyclical pattern between the two occurrences—namely that conflict can contribute to climate change just as profoundly as climate change can contribute to violence.

The author challenges the tendency within scholarly research to discuss climate change with a sharp distinction between past and future, as well as between global and local, natural and social. When “disasters” are discussed in terms of climate change, the focus tends to be on future disasters, on the global causes and ramifications of disasters, and on their relationship with nature—even when nature is shaped by human activity. The author argues that focusing on one end of these paired distinctions to the exclusion of the other prevents us from understanding the complex ways in which climate change is experienced in the very parts of the world declared as the most vulnerable. Instead, what is required is a rethinking of the concept of climate disasters by starting not from the common “climate change causes conflict” framework but “from the lived experiences and the histories of climate change and disaster in specific parts of the world.”

To help illustrate his argument, the author suggests using the concept of devastation to help reach beyond the limitations imposed by the future/past, global/local, and natural/social understanding of climate change and disaster. “Devastation” can better illuminate the events that are typically seen as comprising climate change and climate disaster.

The author illustrates how political violence can be bound up with
destructive environmental change in ways that demonstrate the limitations of future/past, global/local, and natural/social binary thinking by examining the case of drought and violence in Uganda. The particular climate hazard in the case of Uganda is drought and uncommon rainfall. This hazard, the author argues, is produced locally by social forces just as much as it is produced by global, natural forces. International investors have relentlessly advanced the political economy of East Africa’s urbanization. Much of the land and energy required for urbanization comes from the large-scale destruction of local forests, which compounds environmental disasters like flooding, in turn contributing to local and state violence. The drought in northern Uganda should not be viewed as an isolated climate phenomenon but rather as part of a broader context of war, where climate change can also be conceived of as a form of violence—whether through decades of extractive, unequal capitalism or through the vast amount of pollution generated directly by the military-industrial-complex. Additionally, the author argues that conflict must viewed as a product of future climate change or something that contributes to local vulnerability. Instead, it should be seen as spanning both issues. Even though there might be connections between climate change and an increasingly vulnerable population, it is clear that the climate change disaster conversation privileges the future, the global, and the natural but often disregards the need to take the past, the local, and the social into account. Climate disaster response thus must fully and justly engage with past and current forms of violence.
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE

This article makes the case for being more cognizant of past and present structural conditions to help us understand the climate-conflict relationship. We are experiencing a planetary crisis, where climate change, environmental degradation, and resource scarcity need to be viewed in connection with past and present structural conditions. That entails the analysis of colonial history, global inequalities, and resource extraction in our assessment of current conflicts. Today one can speak of so-called “extractive imperialism,” where extractive industries pillage resources in the Global South (where the effects of climate change are most keenly felt) with little or no concern for the social and environmental costs.

When considering the relationship between climate change and conflict, we must examine violent conflicts within a global war system that is inherently destructive to the environment. The advocacy organization World Beyond War has highlighted a series of statistics regarding the environmental toll of violent conflict and the defense industry:

- Military aircraft consume about one quarter of the world’s jet fuel.
- The U.S. Department of Defense uses more fuel per day than the country of Sweden.
- An F-16 fighter bomber consumes almost twice as much fuel in one hour as a high-consuming U.S. motorist burns in one year.
- The U.S. military uses enough fuel in one year to run the entire mass transit system of the nation for 22 years.
- By one military estimate in 2003, two-thirds of the U.S. Army’s fuel consumption occurred in vehicles that were delivering fuel to the battlefield.
- The U.S. Department of Defense generates more chemical waste than the five largest chemical companies combined.
- The majority of the Superfund sites in the U.S. are on military bases.

TALKING POINTS

- The climate disaster conversation should start from “the lived experiences and the histories of climate change and disaster in specific parts of the world.”
- Uganda’s recent drought is part of a broader context of environmental devastation and violence, revealing how political violence is connected to destructive environmental change in ways that highlight the limitations of future/past, global/local, and natural/social thinking.
- Climate disaster response must fully and justly engage with past and current forms of violence.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

There is an ongoing debate over the relationship between climate change and violent conflict. Recently, however, many have argued that a rapidly changing climate, warming temperatures, and the resulting decreased access to resources can lead—and have led—to violence. In 2007, the United Nations Secretary General labeled Sudan’s Darfur region the world’s “first climate change conflict.” Since then, researchers from a variety of fields have suggested further ties between climate and conflict, leading to important analysis and needed insight. One study measured the conflict occurrence and local temperatures in sub-Saharan Africa, finding an increase in conflict during warmer years. When climate patterns were projected into 2030, their predictions translated into a 54% increase in armed conflict on the continent.1 Armed conflicts have many contributing factors, however; and in most cases it is impossible—and certainly not recommended—to talk about a single effect. As this research points out, any examination of climate-related conflict must also include analysis of global asymmetries based upon colonial histories, extractive industries, and unequal trade relationships.

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How the Paris Agreement Can Help Us Get to a Low-Carbon Global Economy


In December 2015, 195 countries and the European Union (EU) adopted the Paris Agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), committing the international community to limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions such that global temperatures rise no more than 2 (or even 1.5) degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. This is an extraordinarily ambitious goal that will require nothing short of the transformation of the global economy—but it is also an absolutely necessary one, scientists agree, if the world is to avoid global environmental catastrophe. The Paris Agreement was a real achievement considering previous challenges associated with implementing the earlier Kyoto Protocol and attempts to negotiate its successor. With these in mind, the author considers whether and how the Paris Agreement a) has broken through the “gridlock” of previous climate negotiations and b) might succeed at “bringing global GHG emissions under control.”

Climate change presents a particularly thorny political challenge for international cooperation due to a few factors: the centrality of carbon to industrialization and the contemporary global economy; the way de-carbonizing the economy requires immediate costs in exchange for long-term gains; the uneven effects of projected environmental changes across countries and also uncertainty about these effects; basic collective action problems at the international level; and the question of historical versus current responsibility for GHG emissions in relation to developed and developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol (adopted in 1997) attempted to address these challenges through a “top-down,” legally binding treaty structure, with a clear distinction between so-called “Annex 1” (developed) and “non-Annex 1” (developing) countries, where emission targets only applied to the former—characteristics the author credits with Kyoto’s ultimate lack of success, as key countries felt they were forced to shoulder too much of the burden, and rising emissions in developing countries weren’t adequately addressed. The Paris Agreement’s most significant departure from the Kyoto Protocol was the shift from top-down, legally binding emissions targets to bottom-up, voluntary pledges on emission cuts in the form of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This move opened the way for reluctant parties (including those developing countries with growing emissions) to get on board with the climate agreement—and for the climate agreement to articulate more ambitious goals, like reaching “net zero” GHG emissions globally between 2050 and 2100. Although not legally obliged to comply with their NDCs, countries—
All things considered, the author sees the Paris Agreement as “a more realistic path” to global climate action in that it takes seriously the realities of international politics and removes previous barriers to agreement. It does so in part by acknowledging—through the focus on NDCs—the centrality of domestic politics to climate action and by supporting climate action at sub-national, transnational, and national levels, especially on the part of non-state (including business) actors. But, importantly, the author argues that the strength of the Paris Agreement lies in the way it embeds these domestically determined commitments in an international system of accountability, combining “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches and making NDCs “the subject of international policy deliberation and coordination” considering global climate realities.

Key to the Paris Agreement’s success will be the effective use of its review mechanism to pressure countries to ratchet up and comply with NDCs, in one of two ways: 1) peer pressure among countries, and 2) naming and shaming by both domestic and transnational civil society. In addition, the Paris Agreement’s success also hinges on its effects on global markets, as business decisions are a major factor in emissions levels. The Paris Agreement influences corporations’ decisions by creating greater certainty for green investments, reiterating support for carbon markets, and innovating forms of “orchestration” that capitalize on private forms of governance.

In short, the author argues that the Paris Agreement “provides a more realistic approach” to global climate action. To facilitate the world’s necessary “transition towards a low-carbon global economy,” its innovative hybrid structure—especially its “new logic of ‘pledge and review’ and the subsequent ‘ratchet’”—will require that climate-leader countries and domestic and global civil society mobilize the pressure needed to enact ever more ambitious emissions targets.

**Collective action problems:** situations where the action that would be in the best interest of the collective (for instance, a massive global reduction of GHG emissions to mitigate climate change) conflicts with the self-interest of individual actors (for instance, how one country’s reduction of GHG emissions can involve significant short-term economic costs), making action in the common interest more difficult. There is an incentive in such situations for individual actors to “free-ride,” enabling them to reap the benefits of others’ cooperative actions while not engaging in these (individually costly) actions themselves. Collective action problems are especially prominent at the global level where there is no central, overarching authority to ensure the compliance of individual actors, so countries often lack adequate reassurance that other countries will follow through which their commitments in the common interest.

**Organizations/Initiatives:**
- Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) platform: http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/map.html
- 350.org: https://350.org/
- Sunrise Movement: https://www.sunrisemovement.org/gnd/
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE

This past December in Poland, climate negotiators from around the world finalized an agreement on the so-called “rulebook” for the 2015 Paris Agreement. This rulebook contains a uniform set of measurements for countries to use to track their own (and others’) greenhouse gas emissions, so that assessments can be made about whether and how well each country is complying with its emission targets. As dry and technical as it sounds, this step is key to the functioning of the Paris Agreement—and of its review mechanism, in particular. A common yardstick provides the means for fellow countries and non-state actors alike to obtain the information they need to exert pressure on countries who may be falling short of their commitments to lower greenhouse gas emissions.

This “win” is sorely needed in light of recent discouraging developments related to climate change. First, the most significant development since the adoption of the Paris Agreement was of course the election of a climate denier to the U.S. presidency in late 2016 and his subsequent announcement that the U.S. would withdraw from the Agreement. Although this withdrawal cannot officially transpire until late 2020, the announcement itself has necessarily influenced the way other countries view their commitments under the Paris Agreement. It has also meant that climate negotiations have lost the U.S. leadership they once had under the Obama administration. Following in Trump’s wake, Jair Bolsonaro was recently elected president of Brazil and threatens to take that country out of the Paris Agreement and to open up vast swaths of the Amazon Rainforest to development. Second, the Trump administration is doing its best to undo progress in terms of U.S. domestic policy by dismantling Obama-era clean air rules that were going to affect the operation of coal plants and bring the U.S. closer to its commitments under the Paris Agreement. Third, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—a group of nearly one hundred climate scientists from around the world—released a report this past October alerting the world of the catastrophic events that would likely transpire as soon as 2040 if global greenhouse gas emissions continue on their current trajectory, as well as the severe economic costs countries would have to pay with this level of warming. Finally, just as the recent climate talks in Poland were convening, the Global Climate Project reported that global greenhouse gas emissions for 2018 were set to rise to an all-time high after plateauing in recent years—essentially moving the world in the opposite direction of what is urgently needed to avert climate crisis.

TALKING POINTS

• The Paris Agreement’s most significant departure from the Kyoto Protocol was the shift from top-down, legally binding emissions targets to bottom-up, voluntary pledges on emission cuts, opening the way for reluctant parties to get on board and for the climate agreement to articulate more ambitious goals.
• The Paris Agreement represents a more “realistic” approach to global climate action in that it takes seriously the realities of international politics and overcomes
previous barriers to agreement by acknowledging the centrality of domestic politics to climate action and supporting growth in climate action at various levels.

- There are two ways in which the Paris Agreement's review mechanism will be capable of pressuring countries to ratchet up and comply with their emissions targets: 1) peer pressure among countries, and 2) naming and shaming by both domestic and transnational civil society.

- The world’s “transition towards a low-carbon global economy” will require that climate-leader countries and domestic and global civil society mobilize the pressure needed to enact ever more ambitious emissions targets under the Paris Agreement.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

As discouraging as the news is on climate change—especially at the official, governmental level—this and other research (see Kuyper et al. under Continued Reading) on the Paris Agreement has shown that we need not invest all our hope (and despair) in governmental-level actors and global agreements. Yes, the domestic policies of national governments and the creation of global agreements are both critical—especially to address collective action problems and to assure countries of reciprocity at the global level—but perhaps just as critical are actions taken by non-state actors: non-governmental organizations, social movements, businesses, local governments, and so on. In peacemaking, for example, a multi-track diplomacy framework “is a conceptual way to view the process of international peacemaking as a living system. It looks at the web of interconnected activities, individuals, institutions, and communities that operate together for a common goal: a world at peace.” Likewise, a similar “systems approach” to climate action encouraged by the Paris Agreement has the potential to engage actors at all levels and in all sectors to strengthen the world’s climate change mitigation efforts. As Kuyper et al. argue, non-state actors play dual roles under the Paris framework: as “watchdogs” with regards to official climate action by countries, holding them accountable to their NDCs and pressuring them to ratchet up these commitments, but also as “governing partners” through “orchestration” efforts whereby they take their own actions on climate change and register these in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) platform.

In other words, there is still much within the power of everyday citizens who wish to take collective action to mitigate climate change, regardless of who stands at the helm of certain powerful countries. We make up domestic and global civil society, and we therefore are those who must make climate change action a priority for our elected representatives. We are the ones who will nonviolently take to the streets to lay bare any discrepancies that form between our own countries’ commitments under the Paris Agreement and their actual greenhouse gas emissions. We are the ones who, as consumers, can pressure companies to wean themselves off fossil fuels and pressure retirement funds to divest from fossil fuels. We are the ones who can initiate and support local legislation to cut greenhouse gas emissions—and then who can register these actions on the NAZCA platform to help build climate action momentum. The Paris Agreement provides an excellent framework for supporting these citizen-led actions so that they do not exist in isolation but rather build on one another to bring needed momentum to global climate action—and ultimately greater security to people around the world.

Continued reading:


From Water Scarcity to Conflict or Cooperation

Climate change, coupled with population growth, is likely to intensify water scarcity around the world. Moreover, increased water use for agricultural and industrial purposes further exacerbates dwindling water availability. These changes affect water availability from a range of sources, including rivers, a source upon which many countries rely. Managing water use from rivers is especially problematic when those rivers are shared by multiple countries. According to the authors, the 263 transboundary river systems in the world act as a vital water source for 40% of the global population.

Bearing in mind these realities, it is no wonder that some perspectives consider water stress between river-sharing countries to be a significant factor in the escalation of conflict. The authors of the present research argue, however, that water stress does not necessarily result in violent conflict and that, when violent interstate conflict does occur, water is only one of many contributing factors. In fact, citing previous research, the authors assert, perhaps counter-intuitively, that water scarcity in transboundary river basins can even provide incentives and opportunities for greater cooperation between countries.

In this study, the authors explore how physical, socioeconomic, political, and cultural variables “interact to affect the likelihood and intensity of water conflict and water cooperation in transboundary river basins.” After an extensive review of previous research, they develop their own framework for understanding what they call the “water-security-conflict nexus.”

Table 2: Integrative conceptual framework of the water-security-conflict nexus.
framework identifies relationships between three major dimensions: physical and socioeconomic drivers that establish water supply and demand; human interpretations and evaluations of water supply/scarcity, especially related to whether it is seen or framed as a security issue; and collective and/or institutional responses to these particular framings of water stress, ranging from war to major cooperation. The heart of the framework, according to the authors, is the central category of human interpretations and evaluations of water stress—especially whether it is framed as a security issue or not—which points to the importance of symbolism and cultural meaning, as well as questions about responsibility, in water conflicts. All of these considerations feed into whether a particular case of water scarcity is seen as a reason to wage war or as an opportunity to cooperate. The authors see this added interpretive/symbolic dimension of their framework as being an important link missing from large statistical studies that cannot adequately account for these cultural and political factors specific to each context.

The authors then turn to applying their framework to two regional cases considered future water security hotspots—the Nile River Basin and the Syr Darya/Amu Darya River Basin—to flesh out the relationships between the framework’s three different dimensions. With regards to the Nile River Basin, the authors highlight the region’s growing population, quickening economic development (especially upstream in Ethiopia and Sudan), and decreasing water availability, marked by some measure of uncertainty about the effects of climate change. There is the potential here for populations to perceive water scarcity as a threat to national security, as well as to human security, which could lead governments to dig into their positions in river basin negotiations and ultimately to bring their countries into conflict. A further complicating factor is Egypt’s potentially threatened status as the “hydro-hegemon” in the region and its political instability in the wake of the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, cooperative efforts have been successful in the past, notably the Nile Basin Initiative (an agreement among Nile Basin countries). Ethiopia’s erection of the Grand Renaissance Dam presents an opportunity for new agreements that could have the capacity, with the existence of strong institutions, to regulate the distribution of water and hydropower.

The Syr Darya/Amu Darya River Basin experiences different challenges but also yields opportunities for cooperation. The countries sharing the river basin—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—grapple with incompatible patterns of water demand and use upstream and downstream, causing flooding downstream in the winter and too little water for agricultural purposes downstream in the summer. Summer water shortages are only expected to worsen with climate change. These water availability challenges have been framed as threats to security, especially in a context where there are “persistent national rivalries and frequent attacks against ethnic minorities.” Furthermore, due to deep-seated mistrust and a win/lose framing of potential water allocation scenarios, countries see no incentive to cooperate. Any effort at water cooperation in the region, therefore, must not only determine water quotas but also address the broader political and security concerns of the various countries.
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE

Understanding how physical water scarcity can evolve into either conflict or cooperation is important to preventing future outbreaks of violent conflict as a result of water scarcity, especially at a time when the effects of climate change are only becoming more pronounced. This framework suggests—and the analysis of two case studies confirms—that water scarcity itself is rarely the heart of the problem. Social, cultural, and political factors play a significant role in shaping the path to cooperation or conflict. In particular, how water scarcity is interpreted—whether it is seen as a security threat or as an opportunity for joint innovation—matters for which path countries will take. Also, because water-related conflicts are usually about much more than “just” water scarcity, cooperative frameworks must take a more holistic approach to account for conflict factors other than physical water availability. Doing so, along with re-framing water scarcity in transboundary river basins as a shared environmental problem that requires joint problem-solving, can transform otherwise contentious situations into opportunities for cooperation.
TALKING POINTS

- Although it can be a factor that exacerbates conflict, water scarcity in transboundary river basins can also provide incentives and opportunities for greater cooperation between countries.
- Socioeconomic, political, and cultural drivers all play a role in the transition from physical water scarcity to conflict or cooperation.
- Large statistical studies cannot adequately account for the crucial cultural, symbolic, or political factors that may influence whether water scarcity brings about violent conflict or cooperation in a particular context.
- The way governments and other institutions interpret and respond to water scarcity—for instance, as a security issue versus as a technological problem to solve—matters for whether it leads to violent conflict or to cooperation.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Applying the authors’ framework to conflicts where water plays a significant role, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, can be useful to determine the viability of conflict resolution strategies. In July 2017, the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority came to an agreement according to which Israel is to provide Palestinians with millions of cubic meters of water from a desalination process. This will ensure that Palestinians have access to drinking water, but, as the framework suggests, there are of course more factors at play in the conflict than availability of water. Increasing water supply alone will not prevent the outbreak of violence or instantly transform existing hostilities because this conflict runs so much deeper than “mere” water scarcity issues. Technological and engineering innovations and agreements are a good start, as they can overcome physical water scarcity and set a precedent for cooperation, but attention must also be paid to broader structural inequalities of which water access is one symptom. Bearing in mind the authors’ framework, international institutions and regional authorities should continue to try to shift the framing of water scarcity from yet another form of insecurity in the conflict to an opportunity for cooperation, while also considering the larger context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (and other conflicts in the Middle East where water is a salient issue). These long-standing interpretations are difficult to challenge, especially in this conflict where water scarcity has been embedded in a broader history of injustice and insecurity. But what this research points out is that interpretations matter and, as persistent as they are, as human-made constructions, they can change—and in the process facilitate cooperation.
Greater resource scarcity due to climate change is only likely to exacerbate already unequal resource distribution, and possibly conflict, with those who have less power in society further losing access to resources and livelihoods. Gender—along with other social identities—positions women and men in particular ways in relation to power and therefore influences both how vulnerable or adaptive they are to environmental change and how they experience violent conflict and its transformation. The authors are interested, therefore, in examining how we think about gender, environmental change, and conflict. Noting the lack of a “comprehensive research framework” integrating all three dimensions, the authors proceed by reviewing three separate existing literatures—environment and conflict, gender and environment, and conflict and gender—to identify gaps and shortcomings but also potentially promising areas for integration.

First, with regards to the literature on environment and conflict, the authors identify four broad schools of thought. Major differences among these schools include whether population pressures necessarily result in resource scarcity and violent conflict, as well as whether “scarcity” is a physical/natural phenomenon or always to some extent a socially constructed one. The so-called constructivist school is seen as having the most potential to include gender as a consideration, as its emphasis on questions of distribution and power—as opposed to simply “natural” scarcity—creates room to consider how people of different identities have greater or lesser access to resources.

Second, in the literature on gender and environment, the authors highlight the different approaches taken by eco-feminists and feminist political ecologists. Whereas the former see women as inherently closer to nature and therefore as “natural” caretakers of the environment, the latter understand gender as a social identity that shapes women and men’s experiences and access to resources, thereby creating different types of knowledge about and relationships with their ecosystems. Further, other scholars have resisted the impulse to equate gender with “women” or to assert the existence of a monolithic category of “women,” instead highlighting the way gender identity intersects in different ways with other (class, racial,
Continued reading:


national, and so on) identities and is also “performed” differently within different contexts.

Turning to the third literature on gender and conflict, amid broader interest in the integration of gender in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the authors note a special focus on sexual and gender-based violence, including its use as a tool for feminizing (read: weakening) male actors in war. With time, scholars have also begun to focus on masculinity and war and to question the “female victim”/“male perpetrator” stereotype.

Although these distinct literatures provide useful insights into the relationships between gender, environment, and conflict, as noted above, there is little work that explicitly examines the three dimensions all together. The authors call, therefore, for “a more holistic approach that simultaneously looks at the macro, meso, and micro levels and their interrelations in order to uncover the role of gender for escalation and de-escalation of resource-related conflicts.” They see some methodological and conceptual challenges, however, in developing such an approach, including the persistence of gender hierarchies despite their fluctuation during conflict, a gap between legal developments and everyday practice with regards to gender relations, the prevalence of weak states in areas where there are resource conflicts, and the broader marginalization of gender concerns—requiring scholars to adopt a long-term view in their research design, as well as to engage in field research focusing on gender practices and non-state/informal actors rather than simply examining a country’s laws or formal state institutions.

The final—and most important—barrier to overcome to open the way for “gender-sensitive research on environmental conflicts” is the existence of the following five persistent gender myths:

1. the equation of gender with “women”
2. the assumption that women naturally possess so-called “feminine” characteristics
3. the simplistic view of women as a neo-liberal investment opportunity
4. the assumption that “women” constitute a homogenous group
5. the perception of women as mainly victims

According to the authors, it is only by “debunking” these five myths that we can begin to better grasp “how conflict processes, global environmental change, and gender intersect,” as well as understand “the implications of gender for peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes in environmental conflicts.”
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE

The civil war in Yemen represents a convergence of conflict, gender inequality, and climate change-induced resource scarcity. Prior to the outbreak of conflict in 2015, Yemen, a country with no rivers, suffered from water scarcity. Deep water well drilling, which began in the 1970s, coupled with a lack of regulation, has rapidly depleted Yemen’s groundwater resources. In the meantime, climate change is making the country drier, shortening the growing season for food. And the recent conflict has only exacerbated the country’s water crises. Additionally, the country has experienced a regression in gender equality, especially in the area of women’s rights, since its unification in 1990. Between 1967 and 1990, South Yemen was its own sovereign country and was a haven for empowered and educated women, while North Yemen had more repressive policies toward women. Upon unification, the customs and laws of the North overtook the norms of the South. Perhaps unsurprisingly, recent UN-led peace talks between the major conflict parties, though a hopeful development, have failed to include women. This, despite the fact that women’s groups have helped prevent fighting over resources at the local level, in addition to bridging divides in other ways.

An integrated framework for understanding the relationships between gender, conflict, and environment would help scholars, policy-makers, and activists alike connect the dots and arrive at more compelling conclusions about the sources of insecurity—and the prospects for conflict transformation—in Yemen.

TALKING POINTS

- Gender—along with other social identities—positions women and men in particular ways in relation to power and influences both how vulnerable or adaptive they are to environmental change and how they experience violent conflict and its transformation.
- There is little work that explicitly examines conflict, the environment and gender together.
- Due to persistent methodological and conceptual challenges, scholars interested in integrating gender, environment, and conflict in their research should adopt a long-term view in their research design, as well as engage in field research focusing on gender practices and non-state/informal actors rather than only examining a country’s laws or formal state institutions.
- Developing an integrated framework for understanding gender, environment, and conflict will require debunking the five following gender myths: the equation of gender with “women,” the assumption that women naturally possess so-called “feminine” characteristics, the simplistic view of women as a neo-liberal investment opportunity, the assumption that “women” constitute a homogenous group, and the perception of women as mainly victims.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

This research reminds us that resource distribution on the basis of various social identities—and as a function of power—is just as relevant to individuals' security as is absolute scarcity as a “natural” phenomenon. How one is positioned in social hierarchies matters for one's level of vulnerability to climate-induced resource scarcity. Furthermore, this research urges us to be more critical of received wisdom with regards to gender that may impede our ability to think clearly or fully about the intersections of gender, conflict, and environment.
This Magazine is where the academic field and the practitioners meet. It is the ideal source for the Talkers, the Writers and the Doers who need to inform and educate themselves about the fast growing field of Peace Science for War Prevention Initiatives!

John W. McDonald
U.S. Ambassador, ret.
Chairman and CEO, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

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Executive Director, Oregon Physicians for Social Responsibility Co-founder, 9/11 Families for Peaceful Tomorrows

The Peace Science Digest is the right approach to an ever-present challenge: how do you get cutting-edge peace research that is often hidden in hard-to-access academic journals into the hands of a broader audience? With its attractive on-line format, easy to digest graphics and useful short summaries, the Peace Science Digest is a critically important tool for anyone who cares about peace – as well as a delight to read.

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Erica Chenoweth
Professor & Associate Dean for Research at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver

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David Cortright
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Director, School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding and Development

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Michael Nagler
Founder of the Metta Center for Nonviolence

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Our vision is a world beyond war by 2030 and humanity united by a global system of peace with justice.

**OUR MISSION**
Our mission is to advance the Global Peace System by supporting, developing and collaborating with peacebuilding efforts in all sectors of society.

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