The Agreement reached at the COP21 in Paris last December was, by almost any standard, a landmark agreement and the successful culmination of years of tedious negotiations. The Paris Agreement commits 187 nations to a common objective, namely, a world with warming limited to well below 2°C, and climate neutrality achieved in the second half of the century. The EU and its Member States can claim to be major contributors to this success as they managed to keep a united front, despite differences among Member States on subject matter, despite the strong headwinds and turbulent times in other policy fields, and despite the tendency of the Common Foreign and Security Policy to break up into less common, national government-driven positions whenever things get tough. On the contrary, at the COP21, diplomats put into action a smart negotiation strategy to build the ‘High Ambition Coalition’, which managed to break up the long-standing divide between developed and developing countries. This has been also a success of EU institutions, notably the Commission and the EEAS, who worked towards a common position across Member States from early on in the process, and of the Member States themselves, who contributed resources and political commitment to the cause.
However, the ultimate success of the Agreement hinges on implementation. (I)NDCs, the contributions countries have committed to, are insufficient. The Agreement contains many elements to ensure that the objectives will eventually be achieved, but it will require a sustained effort in the years to come. EU Climate Diplomacy will need to keep up the positive momentum. Its FAC Conclusions from 15 Feb 2016 recognize this and pledge continued efforts to keep climate change a strategic priority to support implementation of the Paris Agreement and to address the climate-stability nexus. It will be crucial for the FAC to follow up on its intention to elaborate a more concrete, more comprehensive and more ambitious action plan – building on the rather fuzzy list of activities mentioned thus far. Here are some important elements for doing so:
These elements can form a robust basis to prepare the EU for the year 2018 where the first stocktaking will indicate whether Paris really can be considered as a success. But, one thing is already clear: it would send an unacceptable, contradictory signal to partners around the globe if the EU backtracks on its own levels of engagement and puts climate diplomacy on the backburner.
Several climate security studies have assessed the risks of climate change to security and examined potential foreign policy responses, but the connection between climate change and foreign policy remains underexplored. The new Climate Diplomacy Report of the German Foreign Office takes up the challenge.
Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan are currently engaged in vital talks over the dispute relating to the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River. While non-African actors are increasingly present in the negotiations, the African Union (AU) is playing a marginal role.
Climate change was more central than ever at this year’s Munich Security Conference (MSC), the leading international forum for senior military, security and foreign policy leaders. The release of the inaugural “World Climate and Security Report 2020” (WCSR 2020) by the Expert Group of the International Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS) should help policymakers take effective action.
The mission of the Munich Security Conference is to “address the world’s most pressing security concerns”. These days, that means climate security: climate change is the ultimate threat multiplier, and anyone discussing food security, political instability, migration, or competition over resources should be aware of the climate change pressures that are so often at the root of security problems.