At the end of June, the EU Foreign Affairs Council adopted a set of conclusions on EU climate diplomacy that left us with mixed feelings. Acknowledging and recalling that climate change is of paramount importance is commonplace – too often quoted and very seldom followed by decisive action. The explicit reference to the positive results of the Durban and Doha climate conferences is even a reason to get nervous. Many negotiators and observers will doubt a similarly enthusiastic framing for the most recent results.
And yet, the overall picture also leaves room for some expectation and evenhope that – at the European level – new energy will be generated to provide leadership for a comprehensive climate diplomacy needed at different levels. Following the ideas published in the Joint Reflection paper by the External Action Service in 2011, there are three storylines of climate diplomacy that are to shape the overall narrative of EU climate policy.
First, with the June Conclusions, Member States, the Commission and the High Representative reached a consensus that a more strategic approach is needed to ensure a comprehensive global agreement including all major emitters. To consider and accept complementary roles and competences for European players in building alliances for ambitious climate action in the run-up to 2015 can help to avoid a prolonged political stalemate. In the Reflection Paper, developed in parallel to the EU Council Conclusions, this is referred to as a "coalition of ambition” with third countries. With recent domestic efforts in some of the emerging economies like China, such coalitions are more realistic today then some years ago.
Second, to support low-emission and climate resilient development, the EU needs to strengthen its communication of the benefits – climate-related or general – that partnerships with the EU and its member countries can yield. To this end, however, a clear commitment to key climate policy instruments is needed to back any communication strategy. The vote by the European Parliament in early July to approve an emission trading reform process is an important step in this direction. By postponing the auction of 900 million allowances in the ETS, the EU sent a clear signal that it is still determined to address some of the shortcomings of its current low carbon approach – even if it remains to be seen if the reform package agreed will yield the intended results.
Third, the Council reaffirms its leadership in addressing the potential security dimensions of climate change. Apart from envisaging dialogue and cooperation with EU partners to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and switch to greener paths of energy production, it also recognizes the important role of climate change adaptation, which if designed and implemented in a conflict sensitive way, can form an important element in the EU climate diplomacy narrative. The task ahead is to outline how the climate diplomacy toolbox will be equipped. Instruments for resource, energy and water security need to prove their relevance for mainstreaming climate diplomacy into the priority agendas of EU member states and their partners.
More energy will be needed during the next months in Brussels and European capitals – not least to help explain the interests and priorities of the EU regarding an ambitious climate approach for 2015 and beyond.
The impact of climate change is posing a growing threat to peace and security. Germany is therefore putting climate and security on the Security Council’s agenda.
Russia’s economic development minister warned last week that the EU’s plans to deploy a carbon tax at the bloc’s borders will not be in line with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, just as Brussels doubled down on the idea of green tariffs.
Few places have suffered more from the COVID-19 pandemic than southern China, the region where the novel coronavirus was first detected in the city of Wuhan. But it turned out that the pandemic is not the only calamity to befall south China this year. The region has been inundated by heavy rainfall since late May, creating a risk of catastrophic flooding.
Natural resources-based conflicts are sometimes made complex by non-climate push and pull factors, like unemployment and political tension. These factors should be taken into account when developing and implementing a peacebuilding strategy, making sure all stakeholders are at the table – including those fueling the conflict. The online workshop ‘Integrating peacebuilding and climate change mitigation efforts in natural resource management’, organised by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) and adelphi, looked into this complex issue.