In the lead-up to the current crisis in Mali, the impact of climate change should have been a part of the preparation process undertaken by policy makers. In 2011, Oxfam International raised its concern about the drought in Mali similar to the one that has plagued countries in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, a number of studies by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) in 2006 highlighted the drought in Mali in the following way:
The second half of the 20th century has witnessed a dramatic reduction in mean annual rainfall throughout this region and an influx of migrants from nearby states is raising tensions. The drought also threatens to worsen the less-explored phenomenon of 'trapped populations’ in Mali.
Northern Mali and the surrounding Sahel region are burdened by chronic droughts as a result hundreds of thousands of people migrating to more suitable land and to the urban centres. This type of migration is often accompanied by dire consequences.
The challenge posed by climate change could lead Mali to greater threats and instability. Therefore, the international community should consider climate change a “threat multiplier” with the potential to intensify existing conflicts or even create new ones. Unless climate change adaptation is recognised as a viable solution to prevent and resolve conflicts in the face of high vulnerability to climate impacts, the changing climate in this region is likely to generate further conflict.
The recent crisis in Mali is one example of how climate change acts as a “threat multiplier” by exacerbating the existing tensions and triggering new conflict. The nomadic groups, such as the Tuaregs, who rely heavily on the land for their livelihood and feel that their interests are not protected by authority, rebelled over land and pasture, leading to inter-ethnic conflict. The possibility that Mali will face both catastrophic events, such as famines, and further conflict should be granted priority by both policy makers and international partners.
The consequences of climate change will affect a growing number of vulnerable people in this region. They will also exacerbate conflict in Mali unless vulnerable populations are assisted in building climate-resilient livelihoods. Communities and their local institutions must have effective links with national, regional, and international institutions. Adaptation should also be a priority and managed through coordination and cooperation among governments, civil society and the private sector, supported by international actors. Finally, the impact of climate change, which leads to more frequent and intense droughts, floods and desertification, will destabilise Mali in particular and the region in general unless urgent adaptation measures are taken now.
The full article is available here.
The scope of national security is expanding beyond violent threats to encompass a broader array of dangers. In an article for World Politics Review, CFR's Stewart M. Patrick assesses the implications of COVID-19 and climate change for the theory and practice of national security.
Although there is no causality nor direct and automatic link between climate change and conflict, we can see that climate change can intensify conflict drivers and make it harder to find stability. The online workshop "Climate change, conflict and fragility: Increasing resilience against climate-fragility risks", organised by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) and adelphi, looked into this complex relationship.
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous parallels have been drawn between this health crisis and the climate crisis. Science plays an important role in advising decision makers on how to ensure sustainable crisis management and a precautionary approach to avoid harmful repercussions, particularly where we do not yet know all the consequences of our actions. [...]
Decarbonisation won’t come as fast as the pandemic. But if fossil fuel exporters are not prepared for it, they will face an enduring crisis. The EU can help.